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Abstract

Recent attacks on industrial control systems (ICSs), like the highly publicized Stuxnet
malware, have perpetuated a race to the bottom where lower level attacks have a tactical
advantage. Programmable logic controller (PLC) firmware, which provides a softwaredriven interface between system inputs and physically manifested outputs, is readily open
to modification at the user level. Current e↵orts to protect against firmware attacks
are hindered by a lack of prerequisite research regarding details of attack development
and implementation. In order to obtain a more complete understanding of the threats
posed by PLC firmware counterfeiting and the feasibility of such attacks, this research
explores the vulnerability of common controllers to intentional firmware modifications.
After presenting a general analysis process that takes advantage of various techniques
and methodologies applied to similar scenarios, this work derives the firmware update
validation method used for the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC. A proof of concept
demonstrates how to alter a legitimate firmware update and successfully upload it to a
ControlLogix L61. Possible mitigation strategies discussed include digitally signed and
encrypted firmware as well as preemptive and post-mortem analysis methods to provide
protection. Results of this e↵ort facilitate future research in PLC firmware security through
direct example of firmware counterfeiting.
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FIRMWARE COUNTERFEITING AND MODIFICATION ATTACKS
ON PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLERS

I.
1.1

Introduction

Background
Modern industrial applications necessitate the utilization of advanced automation and

management networks collectively referred to as industrial control systems (ICSs). Such
systems are responsible for the precise and consistent operation of many applications
associated with national critical infrastructure.

As ICSs become increasingly reliant

on modern information technology (IT) solutions, including internet protocol (IP)-based
networking and embedded computing, related security concerns also arise [55]. The
progressive amalgamation of these technologies from two traditionally distinct cultures
creates an apparent schism in the cyber security capabilities of IT and ICS environments.
ICS cyber security implementations lag behind the sophistication of more dedicated IT
solutions by comparison.
Cyber attacks on ICSs are increasing in number and scale [24]. Incidents like the
2010 Stuxnet worm exemplify this fact and provide insight into the future of cyber-based
threats. Similar to traditional attacks on IT systems, ICS attacks are targeting lower
level control to allow for more powerful and flexible system manipulation. The allure
of ICS attacks, and the ultimate goal of such malicious manipulation, is the ability to elicit
physical manifestations through cyber means. As the final link between cyber and physical
components of ICSs, programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are critical in the proper
operation of such systems. PLCs are embedded devices programmed to manage and control
physical components responsive to system inputs and requirements. The lowest abstraction
1

layer controlling PLC interpretation of programming, the firmware, represents a significant
potential threat if compromised. Indeed, the malicious modification or counterfeiting
of controller firmware allows complete control over the device and any physical system
components under its purview.
1.2

Motivation
Defensive strategies to mitigate firmware threats must be established. In order to

develop e↵ective defense strategies, the threat must be thoroughly understood. Currently,
little information detailing this threat is readily available. However, if an attacker is able to
successfully manipulate the firmware on a PLC, they can directly control the behavior of
the device to a↵ect the control system while simultaneously masking such actions from the
operator or control software. Although the risk exists, the extent to which an attacker
is capable of exploiting the risk is unknown. There are currently no known examples
of firmware modification attacks on PLCs [24]. Furthermore, research requiring the
availability of malicious or counterfeit firmware lacks test samples for use in analysis. The
creation of custom counterfeit firmware samples can aide in the development of detection
and forensic analysis techniques.
1.3

Research Goals
The goal of this thesis is to determine the feasibility of firmware modification attacks

on PLCs.

Specifically, this research investigates and assesses the vulnerability of a

common PLC to counterfeit firmware updates. This research proposes that common
PLCs are vulnerable to such an attack as a result of design weaknesses associated with
firmware update validation methods. This may be verified by a successful demonstration
of counterfeit firmware uploaded to a common PLC.

2

1.4

Approach
To test a PLC’s vulnerability to counterfeit firmware attacks, the firmware update

validation method is derived through reverse engineering techniques.

The firmware

update validation method is analyzed for weaknesses that facilitate firmware counterfeiting.
Weaknesses are exploited to create a counterfeit firmware sample that is uploaded and
executed on a PLC. This approach is applied to a relevant test environment, consisting
primarily of an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 controller, to allow for a realistic
assessment of the potential vulnerability on a common PLC.
The process to derive the firmware update validation method is based on a review
of previous research describing techniques related to the reverse engineering of PLCs and
other types of embedded devices. By combining and organizing these techniques, a general
process is conceived for deriving the firmware update validation method of a PLC. The
major steps in the process are: (i) firmware sample acquisition, (ii) binary analysis of
firmware, (iii) firmware disassembly, and (iv) derivation of the firmware update validation
method. Step (iv) is further broken down into three approaches: (a) disassembly analysis,
(b) black box analysis, and (c) hardware debugging analysis.
Firmware samples are obtained directly from the vendor website as firmware update
packages. The firmware binaries are extracted from these packages. Following sample
acquisition, binary analysis of the firmware files determine likely image formats and
identify sections of interest related to validation (e.g., header information and candidate
checksum fields). Firmware disassembly requires the determination of the target processor
architecture, disassembly of binary to assembly code, identification of assembly functions,
determination of the firmware base address, string analysis, and rebuilding function names
in the disassembly.
For derivation of the firmware update validation method, disassembly analysis consists
of searching for strings or recovered function names relevant to validation. Black box

3

analysis uses characteristics of common validation algorithms to narrow the search space as
well as brute force techniques to attack the firmware update validation method. Hardware
debugging is also used to physically connect to the controller. This enables direct access to
the execution path of the processor and device memory including the executive loader,
which is typically inaccessible to the user. These techniques result in a preliminary
candidate for the firmware update validation method, which is then confirmed, analyzed,
and exploited to the extent possible.
In order to provide a more complete understanding of the prerequisites for successful
firmware modification, the advantages and limitations of techniques used in the derivation
process are discussed. The e↵ectiveness of each technique is considered in relation to any
time or cost requirements as well as the complexity of their implementation.
1.5

Impact
This research examines and determines the feasibility of counterfeit firmware attacks

on a common PLC. Demonstrating this ability helps distinguish the true nature of the threat
posed by firmware counterfeiting. The described reversing process identifies prerequisite
capabilities of an attacker and limitations of any potential attack. This information provides
the insight necessary to develop defensive and forensic analysis techniques for firmware
modification attacks. In addition to the analysis enabled by this process, direct results
enable the creation of realistic counterfeit firmware samples for analysis in future research.
This aids in the development of e↵ective strategies and tactics for preventing and detecting
firmware modification attacks.
1.6

Organization
Chapter 2 discusses ICS security and reviews associated work in the area of embedded

firmware. Chapter 3 details the approach taken by this research and presents the process
applied to derive the firmware update validation method on the test controller. Chapter 4

4

applies the process to a PLC and analyzes the results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the
research by discussing significance and relevant future work.

5

II.
2.1

Background

Industrial Control Systems
An industrial control system (ICS) comprises a set of components used for the

automated management and control of an industrial process. The term may refer to
a multitude of di↵erent control system schemes, devices, and implementations, which
include the control of production industry processes like automotive assembly plants as
well as critical infrastructure systems including the electrical power grid, water treatment
systems, and chemical industry. This thesis focuses on the protection of such critical
infrastructure.
As an example, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems represent
one specific type of ICS. SCADA systems are typically used in the control and management
of geographically dispersed industrial systems [55].

In the structure illustrated in

Figure 2.1, the human user interacts with the control system through a human machine
interface (HMI). The HMI functions as the operator’s main method of monitoring and
altering physical components to provide external oversight of correct operation. The HMI
connects to a master terminal unit (MTU) that acts as the central automated supervisory
unit of the SCADA system. The MTU monitors and manages the various physical sites
composing the system, but it does not directly control end nodes. This responsibility
is placed on field devices. Specifically, remote terminal units (RTUs) are field devices
designed to control physical aspects of the system. SCADA systems branch out over
various communication channels to assorted RTUs that control and monitor actual physical
objects in the system such as valves and sensors. Another type of ICS, called a distributed
control system (DCS), is a type of system that focuses more specifically on the control of
localized processes. Unlike SCADA systems, DCSs are typically implemented in scenarios
where the entire control system is contained within the same local network.
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Figure 2.1: Typical structure of a SCADA system [55].

A commonly used device in ICSs is the PLC. PLCs are embedded computer systems
specifically designed to control and, to an extent, independently monitor the physical
system components under their supervision. PLCs are commonly used in DCSs and
often times in place of RTUs in SCADA systems due to their enhanced capabilities. As
the name implies, PLCs enable customized control of system components by providing
a user-programmable interface between physical inputs and outputs.

PLCs typically

require proprietary software installed on a standard computer (usually running Microsoft
Windows) to provide a method of programming the controller.

Examples of such

programming software include Rockwell Software’s RSLogix series for managing AllenBradley controllers and Siemens’s Simatic Step 7 for Simatic controllers. With these
applications, engineers commonly utilize a graphical programming language called ladder
logic to create a representation of how the controller should respond to given inputs. By
creating virtual projects in the programming application, a user is able to view the logic
currently running on a PLC as well as write new ladder logic to the device for execution.

7

2.2

Industrial Control System Security
The history of ICSs encompasses decades of steady advancement building to the

complex systems present today. However, the evolution of these systems does not lend
itself well to a satisfactory development of security practices and implementations. While
such development continues to progress through the influence of regulation and research, it
is often outpaced by advancing threats [13]. This section provides an overview of growing
threats to ICSs and their significance on the future of ICS security.
2.2.1

History.

2.2.1.1

Past Incidents.

Cyber incidents related to ICSs are certainly not new; however, much has changed
regarding the subject in a relatively short amount of time. A true history of ICS cyber
incidents is difficult to compile considering low reporting rates due both to unrecognized
incidents as well as the implications of recognized incidents on the reputation of those
involved. Without any obligatory reporting procedures, only highly visible incidents are
publicly reported.
The incident widely considered the first reported cyber attack against critical
infrastructure took place in 1997 [1, 21]. In March, a teenager successfully hacked into
a local service provider’s loop carrier and disabled it. This resulted in the disruption of
communications to and from the Worcester Regional Airport air traffic control tower. Also
a↵ected were communications for airport security, fire department, and weather service,
as well as about 600 homes in the nearby area of Rutland, MA. The attack was executed
using a dial-up modem connected to the disabled loop carrier. Three years later, in 2000,
another attack took place in Queensland, Australia [54]. After three months of what was
thought to be system glitches at the Maroochy Water Services plant, intentional malicious
action was discovered. The actions were traced back to a disgruntled contractor who had
failed to procure a new job with the Maroochy Shire Council. Over the course of the three
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months he had used a laptop and radio transmitter to create problems in the system and
consequently released a total of around 1 million liters of sewage into local waterways.
In addition to these early attacks on critical infrastructure, the combined proliferation
of computer worms and viruses over the past decades has led to unintentional e↵ects
resulting from the propagation of malware to ICSs. The first major reported incident of
such a situation occurred in 2003 by means of the Sobig worm [42]. The Sobig worm
managed to propagate to critical areas on CSX train systems, causing the shutdown of train
signaling and dispatch services along the east coast of the United States. As a result, a
cascade of delays was created, a↵ecting many trains for hours. The same year was also
marked by the Davis-Besse incident [45]. As a result of uncontrollable propagation of the
Slammer worm, the safety monitoring system at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
in Ohio was disabled. Fortunately, the plant was idled at the time, so no reactors were
active. There also remained an analog backup safety system that remained una↵ected;
however, the fact that the worm could so easily impact the power station with no specific
intent is concerning. Slammer was originally introduced into the unsecured network of
a plant contractor. From there it was able to propagate across a T1 line that completely
bypassed the plant firewall. In another 2005 case, the Zotob worm unintentionally attacked
DaimlerChrysler [47]. By exploiting a bu↵er overflow in Microsoft’s Plug and Play service,
Zotob propagated onto DaimlerChrysler manufacturing plant networks and forced random
system reboots [40, 48]. These disruptions shut down 13 manufacturing plants across 6
states for about an hour.
2.2.1.2

Stuxnet.

In 2010, the Stuxnet worm was discovered. This malware is now infamous as the
epitome of advanced ICS threats. Reports indicate that Stuxnet was a highly targeted attack
against specifically configured PLCs controlling particular ICS processes [12, 14]. The
reports suspect that the initial infection vector was through the use of removable media

9

devices. These may have been planted for unsuspecting employees to find and use, or the
attackers may have breached physical security to deliver the worm [19]. Once introduced to
a computer running Microsoft Windows, Stuxnet bypasses antivirus software and detects if
Step 7 software is installed. If so, the worm replaces the main function library used by Step
7 with a malicious version. Stuxnet also places itself in any other removable media attached
to the computer and any Step 7 project files for future propagation. When the malicious
Step 7 library is loaded by a program, it runs a routine to search for specific PLC models
that are connected to specific frequency converter drives used to control motor speeds. If
such a PLC is found, Stuxnet injects malicious programming to the PLC that alters the
motor speed, causing damage. In addition to the injection of malicious programming, the
malicious Step 7 function library also masks the modified PLC code from the operator on
an infected computer.
2.2.2

Future Threats.

In June of 2011, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released
the most recent version of their Guide to ICS Security [55]. The authors note that ICS
technology is advancing by integrating with more traditional IT system solutions like IPbased communications and standard computers. As this occurs, ICSs become less isolated
and more vulnerable to security threats. Traditional IT security solutions may be applicable
to modern ICSs in some regards, but special consideration must be made in areas where
traditional IT has no experience. Because of the cyber-physical link ICSs provide, issues
such as human safety [21, 42, 45] and environmental [54] e↵ects may be impacted by any
gap in security.
A common trend witnessed in traditional computer malware is a race to the bottom
where lower level attacks have the advantage over more overt and limited high level attacks.
For example, user mode malware may be easily detectable as a file or running process and
may be limited by security features present in the operating system. Alternatively, kernel
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mode malware is able to hide itself with rootkit functionality and may control kernel level
processes inaccessible to a user mode program.
A similar trend is developing in the field of ICS security. Already, attacks like Stuxnet
focus on the PLC given that it provides a link between the ICS and components a↵ecting
the physical world. At the highest level of PLC control, many current exploits focus on
application layer vulnerabilities using hard-coded passwords to access control interfaces.
Stuxnet takes this a step further by modifying the programming on PLCs and masking
the change from operators using rootkit functionality on the Step 7 Windows machines.
However, these modifications are not malicious to the PLC itself. The PLC is designed to
be remotely programmable and the code loaded on the PLC by Stuxnet is valid operating
code, so the device is only a conduit for the attack. Stuxnet takes advantage of the malicious
Step 7 function library to hide modifications from infected Step 7 machines [19]. The
PLC continues to run as it is instructed and the operator cannot observe modifications
to the code; however, if the PLC is accessed from a non-infected Step 7 machine, the
modifications are visible. The logical progression of attacks is to a↵ect the PLC in such a
way that no external observer can readily detect malicious modifications.
2.3

Programmable Logic Controller Security
Specific focus on cyber security from the perspective of PLCs remains a serious issue

in ICSs. In a 2012 paper, McMinn et al. describe the existence of three operational layers
on a PLC: (i) programming, (ii) firmware, and (iii) hardware [33]. This section discusses
the major vectors available to attack PLCs and their related concerns following this model
(see Figure 2.2).
2.3.1

Programming Layer.

The programming layer is the main channel of interaction between ICS operators and
the PLC. Through this layer, a user provides the device with logic required to operate the
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Figure 2.2: Operational layers of a programmable logic controller.

controller’s given application. Many di↵erent languages are used at the programming layer
including modified implementations of traditional languages such as C or BASIC [27];
however, the typical method used to program controllers is a graphical language called
ladder logic. Ladder logic provides engineers, who may be unfamiliar with traditional
programming languages, an intuitive interface to the controller. Programming software
used to upload the logic to the PLC (e.g., RSLogix) compiles the graphical language to
low level code for execution before uploading the code to the device. The programming
uploaded to the device is analogous to a desktop application run on a traditional computer.
For the PLC, the programming dictates how the controller responds to input. Because
the program loaded on the controller is managed by programming software, modifications
solely made to the program can be readily detected, as mentioned in the Stuxnet discussion.
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2.3.2

Hardware Layer.

The hardware layer consists of the physical chips and components that make up the
PLC. Among other components, this layer includes the microprocessor, volatile run-time
memory, and non-volatile storage memory. Security at this layer is based on physical
protection. From a malicious perspective, three main vectors are available to attack the
hardware layer: physical manipulation of the hardware, software exploitation of hardware
design flaws, and supply chain compromise to intentionally create vulnerabilities. Of these,
physical manipulation is the least likely in an operational scenario as this would require the
attacker to have intimate access to the device, possibly for extended periods of time. Such
an attack implies an insider threat scenario, in which case more straightforward methods
of attack like direct malicious reprogramming are possible. The second vector of attack
at the hardware layer reduces to a software-based attack where physical design flaws are
exploited by software running on the device. This requires exploitation through either the
programming layer or the firmware as discussed in the following section.
The remaining attack vector is supply chain compromise.

If an attacker can

compromise the supply chain of components for a device, they may be able to influence
their design and engineer vulnerabilities, providing backdoors to the system. Detection
of supply chain compromise is a difficult and costly endeavor. The analysis and reverse
engineering of a physical component in an attempt to detect malicious logic requires a
significant amount of time. Modern microprocessors have become so complex that such
methods are not feasible in many cases. In those cases where it is, the device is likely
destroyed in the process. For these reasons, researchers are investigating viable alternatives
using side channel methods [57]. By analyzing changes in signal metrics such as timing
and power, comparisons are made to known-good reference circuits to determine if any
di↵erences are present in the test device. This method assumes that the modification
of a circuit results in a noticeable change in the power requirement or timing of the
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circuit. However, many challenges remain in this area of research. Not only is a trusted
baseline required for comparison, but the possible implementations of malicious logic are
so numerous and complex that choosing appropriate detection metrics is difficult.
Presenting a comprehensive approach, Baldwin et al. explore the issue of supply chain
trust from a strategic perspective and propose new policies to integrate “system security
engineering” into the current Department of Defense acquisition life cycle [7]. This
proposal follows a cradle-to-grave approach to security. Pre-development planning focuses
on security from the start by analyzing possible vulnerabilities of system components.
Supply chain risk management is discussed and encompasses various techniques to
minimize the threat of supply chain compromise. For critical components, a full scope
supply chain analysis is performed to identify all suppliers involved with component
production. The concept of trusted suppliers is introduced where strict requirements are
imposed for such vendors. The purchasing of components should also follow diverse
redundancy and anonymous buyer practices to minimize the probability of compromise.
System testing focuses specifically on critical components as they interact with the rest of
the system as well as many other non-hardware based secure design practices throughout
the system life cycle.
While a serious issue warranting concern, hardware layer security is ultimately
immaterial in the context of current production systems. At some point, assumptions must
be made about the security of the hardware. Indeed, these assumptions are already made
by vendors and consumers by the fact that the devices are in use. This fact reinforces the
concept that while strict physical security, thorough quality control, and a secure supply
chain are important, these are complex issues requiring more specialized and long-term
solutions unconcerning many field devices in current production or operation.
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2.3.3

Firmware Layer.

Bridging the low level hardware layer to the upper level programming layer is the
firmware layer. Firmware is the low level software run on the device to support higher level
operations. For this reason, firmware is commonly referred to as the operating system (OS)
of embedded devices. In a broader sense, however, firmware also includes lower level
functionality like bootloader code to initialize and load the OS.
This layer in a PLC that controls the basic behavior of the device including
communication with management systems and execution of the user-level program written
to the device. Firmware handles all interactions between the user and the device hardware,
including physical inputs and outputs. The functional analogy of OS firmware is further
extended when discussing potential threats to the PLC. The traditional operation of a rootkit
on a standard computer is equivalent in concept to how an attacker may take advantage of
OS firmware in a controller to hide modifications. Rootkits typically exploit kernel-level
processes to gain privileged access to OS functionality. Using this access, rootkits are able
to modify the underlying behavior of the OS. In the same way, an attacker with access to
the firmware on a PLC has potentially limitless control over the device including the ability
to covertly alter device behavior in a malicious fashion.
In some embedded devices, firmware is programmed from the factory and designed
such that it remains static and not reprogrammable. In such cases, firmware is relatively
safe from modification attacks. However, modern embedded devices including PLCs are
commonly designed with the capability to update the firmware. This ability allow vendors
to patch bugs present in the firmware as well as enable new features without requiring
physical updates of the hardware. Given a device with reprogrammable firmware, the
procedure of performing the update is usually the responsibility of the user, typically
through the application of an update software package. Since a user has access to update the
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firmware, however, the process facilitates an attacker’s ability to upload modified firmware
to a device.
2.4

Previous Works on Reversing Firmware
2.4.1

Discovering Backdoors in Ethernet Modules.

In a December 2011 web article, independent security researcher Ruben Santamarta
describes a process used to discover backdoor accounts and passwords for a Modicon
Quantum PLC Ethernet module [51]. While the goal of his research was not to modify
the firmware, but to uncover these backdoors, the process he follows is applicable to search
for validation algorithms in firmware.
To begin the reversing process, Santamarta obtains a copy of firmware for the target
controller. He does so by downloading the firmware from the vendor website. An
entire update package is obtained, where the actual firmware binary is contained within.
Therefore, the binary image itself is found and extracted from the rest of the package. An
inspection of the the update package contents reveals the location of the firmware image
to extract. Santamarta advises that other files in the update package may contain useful
information about the firmware and continues examining the firmware itself.
The first step is a manual inspection of the binary image using a binary file editor.
This procedure reveals a file header followed by a zlib-compressed section, identified by
its leading binary signature. After decompressing this section, he proceeds to identify the
processor type, which is a PowerPC. While he does not go into detail about his method
of processor type determination, Santamarta references a presentation by Igor Skochinsky
[53] detailed in Section 2.4.3.
Following this determination, Santamarta begins the process of disassembly by
loading the binary file into the Hex-Rays Interactive Disassembler (IDA), a disassembler
tool. At this point, he presents a common process for reconstructing the firmware code in
IDA. The process begins by collecting information from strings contained in the firmware
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image. A copyright string identifies the firmware as VxWorks-based OS. Next, since IDA
is not able to automatically detect functions in this binary image, Santamarta describes a
method to resolve functions in the disassembly by searching for common function prologue
bytes. He then commands IDA to treat these addresses as functions by disassembling their
code and adding them to an internal database. Santamarta provides the source code of the
IDA script he uses to perform this task.
Now that IDA has disassembled and identified functions in the image using the
standard prologue, Santamarta “rebases” the image by altering the code base address to that
which it assumes at runtime. He suggests that the true base address may be located in the
firmware header or other documentation, but determines this is not so for his case. Instead,
he uses the “‘[load immediate] instructions’ trick” [58]. This method consists of searching
the disassembly for instructions that load an immediate (i.e., absolute) address value into
a register. The technique presumes that a significant number of immediate addresses refer
to locations in the firmware itself, and therefore have the same base address. Candidate
base addresses are then tested by rebasing the firmware and determining if the immediate
addresses correctly align with target data such as strings or other functions.
After successfully rebasing the firmware, Santamarta rebuilds the function symbols,
or names. He begins by searching the firmware for a symbol table. This is identified as
a section of the code containing a regularly repeating data structure that includes function
name strings. He discovers such a table and, using another IDA script, parses the symbol
table and relabels the disassembled functions with their proper names. This enables
Santamarta to use symbol names in finding sections of the firmware relevant to his goal
of discovering backdoor accounts. Indeed, he finds many undocumented accounts for the
Ethernet module.
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2.4.2

Creating Custom Firmware for Ethernet Modules.

In a 2009 paper, Peck and Peterson demonstrate a successful upload of customized
firmware to an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix Ethernet module [44]. Their goal is to show
that an attacker can learn how to upload custom firmware to a field device Ethernet
card using commonly available tools. They justify their choice of Ethernet card targets
by describing the vulnerable state of Ethernet modules and their ease of access through
remote network means. Peck and Peterson proceed to explain their method of reversing the
Ethernet module firmware and subverting the card’s validation algorithm.
Peck and Peterson first acquire multiple firmware samples for the target Ethernet
module. These samples are downloaded from the manufacturer website. Peck and Peterson
explain the importance of obtaining multiple samples for comparison as a way to identify
static fields in the images. With firmware samples available, Peck and Peterson begin
inspecting the binary files, looking for and identifying di↵erent segments that exist in the
image (e.g., blocks of code, filesystems, or strings).
After the manual inspection, Peck and Peterson utilize a binary analysis tool called
Deezee, which searches binary files for embedded zlib-compressed sections, extracts, and
decompresses them [38]. Using this tool, Peck and Peterson discover a zlib-compressed
section containing the symbol table for the firmware, identified by a regularly repeating
pattern of addresses and string symbol names. Further analysis of the symbol table reveals
function addresses listed as absolute values. Using these addresses they infer the base
address of the image.
Peck and Peterson next attempt to disassemble the firmware code using IDA. However,
a known processor type is required, so they initially assume that the target uses an ARM
core. They are incorrect, but infer from the result of the attempted disassembly that the true
processor type is PowerPC. Another attempt with this target processor type is successful
and produces disassembled code. A rebase of the image is then performed using the base
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address derived from the symbol table. Finally, Peck and Peterson use a script to add the
symbol names to the disassembly.
Peck and Peterson continue to search for the firmware validation algorithm used by
the Ethernet module. By searching through the symbol names, they discover a function
named nv RamValidateChecksumsWriteFlash. An examination of this function reveals
a subfunction call that performs a checksum validation calculation. Peck and Peterson
reverse engineer this function to derive the entirety of the checksum validation algorithm
used by the firmware. Their target device uses a 2-byte summation of the image header
and a 2-byte summation of the remaining firmware image, both of which are located in the
header.
With knowledge of the validation algorithm, as well as the location of the checksum
values, Peck and Peterson customize the firmware with a proof-of-concept that instructs the
Ethernet card to continually ping a specific IP address in addition to its normal operation.
The authors note the importance of taking care not to disrupt default operation of the device.
Finally, the customized firmware is uploaded to the Ethernet module using the ControlFlash
firmware programming software Rockwell Software provides. While they admit that a
custom flash program could be written to accomplish the task, Peck and Peterson argue
that it is simpler to use the vendor supplied software.
2.4.3

General Processes for Reverse Engineering Embedded Devices.

In a presentation at the 2010 Recon security conference, Igor Skochinsky, a software
developer on the Hex-Rays IDA team, provides an introduction on reverse engineering
embedded firmware [53]. In Skochinsky’s process, he first retrieves a firmware image.
He provides various methods for doing so, the first of which is obtaining a firmware
update from the vendor. Skochinsky notes that this method for acquiring firmware is
straightforward and that the updates obtained may also contain firmware upload programs,
filesystems, or bootloader images in addition to the main firmware, which may be relevant.
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One may also take advantage of external communications with the device. While taking
more time and e↵ort, a communication program on a separate computer from the device
could be reverse engineered to reveal methods of instructing the device to transmit sections
of memory containing firmware code.

Another technique is the use of a universal

asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) port on the device. This method is complex,
possibly involving the identification of and connection to physical UART pins on the device
if no standard serial port is present. After physical connection, it may be possible to
dump the firmware from the device using certain commands sent over UART, depending on
the device’s support for UART. Similarly, Skochinsky also discusses the use of hardware
debugging tools to dump the contents of memory, as discussed in Section 2.4.4. Finally,
Skochinsky mentions the tactic of reading flash memory directly from the storage device;
however, this typically requires the physical removal of an embedded flash chip from the
board by desoldering.
With possession of the firmware, Skochinsky next characterizes the image. This
begins by identifying any filesystems embedded in the firmware. He discusses various
common filesystems utilized by embedded systems, how to identify them (typically using
binary signatures), and how to unpack them into a usable form and access the files within.
Following this, Skochinsky’s discusses how to identify the embedded operating system
type. Again, he walks through various embedded operating systems and how to identify
them. Identification usually involves locating copyright strings containing the developer or
operating system name. The final characterization before code disassembly is identification
of the processor type. Skochinsky begins by explaining the di↵erences between major
design types (e.g., reduced instruction set computing (RISC) versus complex instruction
set computing (CISC)), then discusses the general attributes of several popular embedded
architectures and how to identify them by signature byte patterns common to that
architecture’s instruction coding.
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Skochinsky’s final step is disassembly of the firmware code. If the firmware is
contained in a structured image such as an executable and linkable format (ELF) or other
OS-specific format, a disassembler like IDA may be able to automatically disassemble the
code, determining much of the code structure from the wrapper. However, if the firmware
format is raw binary, additional work is required to create the equivalent disassembly. The
first step of this process is determining the correct base address for the binary. Skochinsky
suggests initializing the base address to 0, then searching the code for hints of the true
base address if the use of 0 fails to produce complete disassembly. Such hints include
self-relocating algorithms that copy code using the correct base address, initialization code
that uses the base address to load code from non-volatile flash memory to volatile randomaccess memory (RAM), jump tables that contain absolute addresses, or string table o↵sets
to compare with the addresses of strings they point to. After successfully rebasing the
code, Skochinsky discusses recovering symbol information. He explains the extraction of
symbols from a Linux kernel and provides an example of the VxWorks symbol structure.
Skochinsky also suggests searching for a demonstration or evaluation copy of the OS type,
if it is known, to allow for comparisons between it and unknown code in the disassembly.
2.4.4

Hardware Debugging.

Hardware debugging is commonly used in the production of embedded systems as a
method to test and verify system components as well as debug software at the processor
level. One common hardware debugging standard is the the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 1149.1 Standard Test Access Port and Boundary
Scan Architecture [25]. This standard is often referred to as Joint Test Action Group
(JTAG), after the name of the consortium that created the standard [43]. Boundary scanning
with JTAG requires a specialized hardware debugger connected to the test board through
special pins called test access ports (TAPs). The standard specifies certain pin signals
required to control the device under test. Four signal pins and an optional fifth are the
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minimum defined by the standard: clock synchronization (TCK), mode select (TMS), data
input (TDI), data output (TDO), and the optional reset signal (TRST). JTAG operates on a
per-chip basis, so an integrated circuit (IC) on the target board must be designed to support
JTAG. Typically, these chips are microprocessors. Given multiple components on a board
that support JTAG boundary scanning, the same TAPs can be used to access all of them.
This is known as chaining.
In a 2006 paper, Breeuwsma provides an introduction on JTAG and how to take
advantage of it for forensic imaging of embedded applications [10]. Breeuwsma describes
three main modes of operation for a JTAG-enabled device: normal operation mode, external
test mode, and debug mode. Normal mode bypasses boundary-scan functionality to allow
normal operation of the chip. External test mode provides basic JTAG functionality. In
this mode, the processor core of the target is disabled. Instead, the input/output (IO) pins
of the target chip are driven by values stored in the boundary-scan test register called test
vectors. Using test vectors, the hardware debugger can completely control the IO signals
on the target. This is useful for hardware validation and low level debugging operations
including direct memory accesses.
Debug mode is an advanced operating mode allowed by JTAG to facilitate software
testing and debugging. This mode requires special circuitry built into the target chip not
specifically defined by the standard. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the implementation
of debug mode to vary among di↵erent chips. In some cases, JTAG enabled components
may lack debug circuitry altogether and only support external test mode. However, if
the chip is designed with support for this mode, software executing on the chip may be
debugged in real time. Depending on the target’s implementation, debug mode may also
enable access to memory on the target system without requiring specifically crafted test
vectors as with external test mode.
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Breeuwsma continues by describing techniques to identify JTAG TAPs on a device.
The general process beings by searching for test pads on the target circuit board and
eliminating as many as possible from the list of TAP candidates. Breeuwsma provides a list
of characteristics common to JTAG TAPs that bound the search space. Such characteristics
include the fact that TAP signals should remain constant while the system is running with
no debugger attached. TAP traces should also not connect to non-IC components like
capacitors (however, pull-up or pull-down resistors may be present). Lastly, TAP signals
should not be driven by an output. After applying these rules for elimination, Breeuwsma
provides additional detail on TAP characteristics to confirm those remaining candidates as
TAPs.
2.4.5

Checksum Algorithms.

As discussed in Section 2.3.3, firmware on embedded devices such as PLCs is
often updated by manufacturers. Firmware update processes typically include the use of
validation methods to confirm that the newly uploaded image is not corrupt [44]. This
section provides an overview of various types of algorithms commonly used for data
validation with a specific focus on the validation of firmware updates.
A hash function is defined as a function that maps data of an arbitrary length to a fixedlength value called the hash value [34]. A checksum algorithm, then, is any type of hash
function used for the purposes of validating data integrity [59]. The resulting hash value
generated by a checksum algorithm is referred to as the checksum value or, succinctly, the
checksum. There exist various algorithms used for calculating checksums that fall into five
general categories: parity checks, modular summations, cyclic redundancy check (CRC),
non-cryptographic hashes, and cryptographic hashes. Parity check algorithms, typically
synonymous with longitudinal redundancy checks (LRCs) [39], calculate a checksum value
by applying the exclusive or (XOR) operation to each n-bit word over the data set. This
produces an n-bit checksum value representing the “parity” of each bit position in every
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word [28]. Parity algorithms have the advantage of being computationally inexpensive and
straightforward implementations; however, they are less accurate in detecting data errors
then other algorithm types mentioned here. Typically, the only variation between parity
check implementations is the bit width of each word in the calculation.
Modular summation algorithms are based on the addition of each n-bit word in a data
set with the next. The resulting sum is represented using a given modulus to create a
checksum value of the desired bit width. Note that the term “checksum” is sometimes used
by other works in reference to modular summation algorithms specifically; hence, there is
common cause for confusion. This thesis, however, uses the term “checksum” in reference
to the resulting value of any hash function used for the purposes of validating data integrity.
Another specific type of modular summation algorithm is the Fletcher algorithm [20]. This
algorithm calculates a modular summation as before, but also includes a second modular
sum of those simple sums, creating two values that compose the checksum. Fletcher
algorithms can be calculated with various moduli to achieve bit widths of 16, 32 or 64
bits. Each of these widths has a commonly used modulus associated with it. A further
specific variation of the Fletcher algorithm is the Adler-32 algorithm which uses the specific
modulus of 65,521 for both sums [17]. Modular summation algorithms allow for more
accurate error detection than parity checks while remaining straightforward to implement.
However, the variability of di↵erent modular summation methods is much higher than
parity algorithms. Since several di↵erent schemes are based on the summation concept,
determination of a specific algorithm is more difficult than for parity checks.
A CRC is a type of algorithm that uses polynomial division on a data set to produce
a checksum value representing the remainder of this division.

The specific process

used in the CRC calculation is detailed by Ramabadran and Gaitonde [46]. In general,
implementation include a series of incremental XOR operations over the data, where the
result of each increment is dependent on the polynomial, the data, and the preceding
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result. A CRC is based on variable parameters including width of the checksum value,
the static polynomial value, initial checksum value, the final XOR value applied to the
resulting checksum, and whether or not input and output bytes are reflected for endianness.
Therefore, the specifics of CRC algorithm implementations are highly variable. CRCs have
the benefit of more accurate error detection rates than modular summations [32]. While
more computationally complex than the above algorithms, CRCs remain less complex than
the remaining categories.
Dedicated hash functions are categorized as either non-cryptographic or cryptographic.
While, by definition, all the algorithms discussed here are hash functions, these two categories refer to functions specifically designed to minimize collisions. A collision occurs
when a hash function is applied to two unique sets of data and the resulting calculations
produce identical hash values. Since the previous categories of algorithms are not designed
specifically to prevent this outcome, they remain vulnerable to collisions. Thus, dedicated
hash functions are better suited to detect changes in input data, but usually at the cost of
computational speed and complexity.
The di↵erence then between non-cryptographic and cryptographic hash algorithms
is that in addition to their sensitivity to accidental modifications of data, like previous
functions, cryptographic hash algorithms are also capable of detecting intentional
modifications. Specifically, cryptographic hash functions are not feasibly vulnerable to
collisions or reversal. To a lesser extent than previous categories, one is still feasibly
able to find collisions in non-cryptographic hash functions or reverse them to determine
a data set that produces a given hash value. Cryptographic hash functions, however, are
not considered vulnerable to such attacks in any feasible manner. For example, it may
be technically possible to find a collision in a cryptographic hash function through brute
force, but the computational resources required to do so in a reasonable amount of time
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are unrealistic. Many cryptographic hash functions exist, most notably the secure hash
algorithm (SHA) family of algorithms [41].
Given that embedded devices are typically limited in available memory and computational ability, less complex checksum algorithms are more feasible than cryptographic
hash functions for such applications [32]. However, there exists a trade o↵ between the
simplicity of an algorithm and its ability to accurately detect changes in data. For these
reasons, modular summation and CRC algorithms are commonly used as validation methods for embedded systems. Their balance of computationally inexpensive calculation and
reasonably accurate detection rates of unintentional errors make them popular in applications such as Ethernet, transmission control protocol (TCP), and the VxWorks embedded
OS [26, 44]. As discussed by Maxino and Koopman, however, some embedded applications may also take advantage of completely proprietary checksum algorithms, especially
in the case of embedded control networks [32].
2.5

Summary
Much of the nation’s critical infrastructure relies on ICSs to monitor and automate

control processes. As these systems evolve from traditionally isolated and specialized
implementations to adopt common IT solutions, they become exposed to cyber attacks.
This is witnessed as ICS cyber incidents progress from isolated attacks to unintentional
impacts caused by computer malware, culminating in the highly targeted Stuxnet attack
on control systems. As these attacks advance, focus is shifted from targeting highlevel application systems to direct threats against PLCs. PLCs consist of a user-level
programming layer, a low-level firmware layer, and a physical hardware layer. The
ability of firmware to completely dictate behavior of the device with no direct operator
oversight presents an attack vector accessible by legitimate means and capable of masking
malicious activity, unlike the observable programming layer and inaccessible hardware
layer. Previous works discuss various techniques for reverse engineering embedded devices
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with a specific focus on PLCs and firmware modification. Other works on the topics of
hardware debugging and checksum algorithms as they relate to embedded devices augment
such techniques to provide a comprehensive survey of the field.
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III.

Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology by providing a problem definition and general
approach, briefly describing the procedure and purpose of each step in the conceived
process, and finally detailing the factors considered in assessing advantages and limitations
of the composed techniques.
3.1

Problem Definition
Strategically, the intended result of this research is to further defensive measures

and forensic analysis techniques targeted toward advanced ICS threats by determining the
feasibility of firmware modification attacks on PLCs. Specifically, the goal of this e↵ort
is to investigate and assess the vulnerability of a common PLC to counterfeit firmware
updates. The achievement of this goal provides valuable information and insight regarding
the feasibility, technical requirements, and characteristic implementation of future firmware
related threats to PLCs.
This research proposes that common PLCs are vulnerable to firmware modification
attacks as a result of design weaknesses in firmware update validation methods. A design
weakness is defined as a failure of the device to properly detect intentional modifications
to firmware. An appropriately counterfeited firmware is expected to be accepted through
the standard firmware update process of the controller and execute on the device in
no distinguishably di↵erent manner than any given legitimate firmware, save for any
modifications present in the counterfeit version.
3.2

Approach and Scope
The process to derive the firmware update validation method is based on a thorough

review of previous research involving the reverse engineering of similar embedded devices
(see Section 2.4). Relevant tactics and procedures are compiled into a general process to
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identify the firmware update validation method. The approach is applied to a production
PLC that is both commercially available and commonly used in ICS implementations.
Through this application, the constituent techniques of the reversing process are assessed
for advantages and limitations in their ability to derive the firmware update validation
method. Furthermore, feasibility of the threat posed by firmware modification attacks on
PLCs is determined by a successful upload of counterfeit firmware. The reversing process
provides a basis for the strategic intent of furthering defensive and analytic research on the
topic.
The scope of this research is limited to PLC firmware counterfeiting. In a layered
operational model, each layer is functionally independent of every layer above it and
functionally dependent on every layer below it. Given the layered operational model of
a PLC, the firmware layer is independent of the programming layer or any higher layer
control mechanisms because the firmware dictates how those higher layer actions are
interpreted. For this reason, no layers higher than the firmware layer are considered in
the scope of this research. Similarly, the firmware layer is dependent on every layer below
it to consistently interpret its actions. Therefore, as the only layer below the firmware,
the hardware layer is considered in the scope of this research. External to the operational
model, the only other considered system component is the firmware update procedure.
Specifically, this research is based on legitimate firmware update procedures only. This
includes any interaction with the device that the firmware interprets as a legitimate firmware
update request, including the manufacturer supplied firmware update procedure or any
procedure sufficiently similar to initiate a firmware update. No other external mechanisms
or components are considered in the scope of this approach including, but not limited to,
auxiliary controller components or the interaction of firmware updates with any external
system.
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3.3

Test Environment and Tools
The testing environment for this research includes an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix

1756-L61, Series B, Standard Controller module manufactured by Rockwell Automation.
This hardware is accompanied by standard firmware available from the manufacturer which
is applied to the device using Rockwell’s standard ControlFlash update software. Since the
scope of this evaluation is bounded to the PLC hardware and firmware layers with standard
update procedures, this specific test environment is equivalent to the intended manufacturer
configuration. The L61 controller module is accompanied in this test environment by a
standard ControlLogix 1756-PA72/C power supply, 1756-A7 chassis/backplane, and 1756ENBT Ethernet communications module to support operation and testing. However, none
of these additional components are considered by the research presented here. Thus, results
of this evaluation are accurate for any standard L61 controller within the given scope.
Additional tools used throughout the evaluation process include the Notepad++
standard text editor and the HxD binary file editor. The binary analysis step of the process
takes advantage of the binary file di↵erence tool Visual Binary Di↵ (VBinDi↵) to perform a
binary file comparison as well as the static binary analysis tool BinWalk for embedded file
and filesystem analysis. Firmware disassembly takes advantage of the IDA tool extensively
for further analysis. Brute forcing techniques discussed as part of black box testing use the
CRC RevEng tool by Gregory Cook. Finally, the explored hardware debugging techniques
include the use of the Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) RealView in-circuit emulator (ICE)
device along with the ARM Development Studio 5 (DS-5) debugging software.
3.4

Reversing Process
An integration of related works discussed in Section 2.4 results in the general reversing

process illustrated by Figure 3.1. This section details the steps in the process: (i) firmware
sample acquisition, (ii) binary analysis of firmware, (iii) firmware disassembly, and (iv)
derivation of the firmware update validation method. While the presented process is based
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on several common methods previously discussed, the nature of reverse engineering is
at times as much an art as it is a science. The process externally requires intuition and
experience on behalf of the investigator. The success and e↵ectiveness of each step may
rely in part on this variable aspect of the process. Nonetheless, the process serves as a
roadmap to follow in deriving operation of the system.
3.4.1

Firmware Acquisition.

In order to begin reverse engineering the firmware, sample copies are first obtained.
The primary method for accomplishing this is by procuring firmware updates from the
vendor, which are typically available from online sources. The firmware binary images
are then extracted from these update packages. Should this not be possible, alternative
measures are taken such as memory acquisition through JTAG or desoldering the flash chip
to directly read its contents. As many di↵erent firmware samples are obtained as possible
to enable a thorough binary file analysis and comparison.
3.4.2

Binary Analysis.

This initial interaction with the firmware involves an examination of the raw binary
files intent on gaining general knowledge required for a detailed inspection.

Three

techniques are applied: manual inspection, binary file comparison, and embedded
file/filesystem analysis.

A manual inspection reveals information about the general

structure and contents of the binary file. In addition to static fields discussed by Peck
and Peterson [44], dynamic fields of the firmware are also identified. Both are determined
through the binary comparison of di↵erent firmware samples with the goal of identifying
header contents and organization as well as fields in the image used for validation purposes.
Embedded file and filesystem analysis is intended to detect the existence of any embedded
files or filesystems in the firmware, which may contain information relevant to the firmware
code operation or organization.
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Figure 3.1: Reversing Process.
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3.4.3

Disassembly.

The next step in the reversing process is disassembly of the binary code. To begin, the
target processor of the binary code is identified. This can be accomplished using techniques
such as Skochinsky’s method of pattern matching [53]. Alternatively, a physical inspection
of the target device hardware, if available, may also reveal details of the processor, as may
a thorough review of official documentation for the system. Once the target processor is
determined, the firmware binary is loaded into the IDA tool for disassembly. Depending
on the format of the binary image, IDA may disassemble the code more accurately and
completely in some cases rather than others. Assuming the firmware format is raw binary,
the initial base addresses is set to 0. Following this, the disassembly function locations
are fixed before proceeding further. Using Santamarta’s IDA script as a template [51] and
knowledge of the target processor’s typical function prologue, IDA disassembles and adds
the firmware function locations to its database, making code traversal and cross references
in IDA more thorough and accurate. Note, however, this does not mean the functions are
correctly named yet, only that they are identified as functions. The disassembled code is
rebased if the initial loaded base address of 0 is incorrect. The correct base address may be
discovered by applying methods described in the Section 2.4. Once the correct base address
is used to disassemble the firmware, IDA matches cross references to more accurately
and thoroughly traverse the code. Next, a thorough inspection of strings contained in the
firmware is performed in order to identify any specifics of the firmware including OS type
and any symbol names or data structure strings. The information gleaned from a string
analysis is useful in learning more about how the code functions and leads into the next
step: recovering symbol information. Rebuilding the firmware symbols may or may not
be completely possible depending on results from the previous step, but strategies such as
scripted renaming of functions based on apparent string names as discussed in Section 2.4,
if successful, result in disassembled code that is more human readable to assist in analysis.
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3.4.4

Derivation of Firmware Update Validation Method.

The goal of modifying the firmware relies on the ability to reverse engineer the
firmware update validation method used by the PLC. The general approach consists of
three phases: disassembly analysis, black box analysis, and hardware debugging methods.
Disassembly analysis begins by searching symbol names for relevant titles indicative of the
validation algorithm, such as those including the terms “checksum” or “CRC.” Afterwards,
the disassembly of such functions is analyzed to determine the validation method. Without
symbol names, this process is hindered. Black box analysis uses several techniques to
infer as much information as possible about the validation algorithm by narrowing down
the search space, testing for the use of common algorithms, and attempting a brute force
attack. Beyond this, the use of hardware debugging tools is also applied. If supported by
the target device, this technique potentially allows for direct access to the device including
live memory and control over execution on the processor to observe the validation as it
occurs.
3.4.5

Reversing Process Considerations.

Advantages and limitations of the techniques used throughout the reversing processes
are considered. A discussion is provided regarding factors including the e↵ectiveness
of each technique in contributing to the successful derivation of the validation method
as well as time, cost, and complexity requirements for doing so.

In the firmware

acquisition step, specific considerations include the availability and ease of access to
multiple firmware image samples from the manufacturer through firmware update packages
or direct acquisition from the device. For the binary analysis step, each technique is
individually considered. The discussion of manual analysis considers the technique’s
ability to extract file header and structure information. Binary file comparison is intended
to identify static and dynamic sections of the firmware images and is assessed on the extent
to which this is possible as well as the significance of information gained by doing so.
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Discussion of the embedded file and filesystem analysis considers the success in identifying
embedded files or containers as well as the accuracy and significance of any findings.
In the disassembly step, the discussion considers if the correct processor type is
identified and the difficulty in doing so. Function identification is assessed by the extent
to which firmware functions are successfully identified in the code. The accuracy of the
determined base address is next considered, as is the rebasing technique’s e↵ectiveness in
finding it. The string inspection discussion considers the number and quality of informative
string values found in the firmware. To conclude this step, the accuracy of firmware
functions renaming is considered.
Derivation of the firmware update validation method is divided into each component
technique. The disassembly analysis is assessed on the ability to identify the validation
method as implemented in the firmware and the e↵ectiveness of being able to find relevant
functions based on the details available. For black box analysis, considerations include the
extent to which a likely class of the validation method is identified as well as the range of
the firmware image covered by the method. Additionally, the brute force technique applied
is assessed on its ability to determine the validation method and the feasibility in using this
technique. Finally, the hardware debugging technique discussion considers the discovery
of the validation method and the costs and e↵ort required to do so.
3.5

Vulnerability Assessment
3.5.1

Firmware Update Validation Method Analysis.

The given candidate for the firmware update validation method is verified for
correctness by applying the reversed method to all available firmware sample images. If all
sample images pass the implemented candidate validation, then verification is successful.
If verification fails, an iterative approach is taken to revisit the derivation process and
determine the cause of the inconsistency before reattempting verification.

35

Following the verification of correctness, the reversed firmware update validation
method is analyzed for potential design weaknesses. The existence of such a design
weakness, as previously defined, means an arbitrary modification to a legitimate firmware
sample image does not hinder the ability of that image to pass validation. To determine
a design weakness, the derived firmware update validation method is analyzed for any
functionality intent on obstructing alteration of the firmware in such a way that prevents
its successful validation. For example, if the firmware is validated with a checksum and
there is no functionality to prevent the successful recalculation of the checksum value
given an arbitrary modification, then a design weakness is determined to exist. If such
a weakness is successfully determined, a solution to take advantage of this weakness is
implemented. This implemented solution, when given an arbitrarily modified firmware
image, processes the image to produce a version of the modified image specifically capable
of passing validation on the device.
Assuming the presence of a design weakness in the validation method and an
implemented solution to take advantage of it, the solution is now tested. This testing
involves determining an innocuous location in the firmware where alteration has no
apparent a↵ect on its operation. One example of such a location is an output string not
used in comparison operations. After making a minor modification in this location, the
implemented solution is applied to the modified image, producing a firmware version
to test for general validity. This modified firmware version is next applied to the same
test environment described above using the standard firmware update procedure for the
device. While it cannot be guaranteed that the device will execute all possible states of the
modified firmware logic, the test is considered successful if the device accepts the modified
firmware as valid and continues to execute the modified firmware version with no apparent
adverse e↵ects. While it is straightforward to determine whether the device faults or not,
its use of the modified firmware version may not be transparent. The latter is verified to
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the greatest extent possible by assessing the operational functionality of the device with
respect to details unique to the uploaded firmware. If the modification can not be verified,
more testing is performed by modifying alternate, more readily identifiable locations in
the firmware. If the device fails to accept the testing modification, an iterative process is
performed to determine the reason for the failure and, if possible, return to the testing phase
when another solution is met.
While working with embedded devices and committing modifications to such lowlevel operational code, there exists a possibility that the device may become unstable and
act unpredictably. In the event that a modified version of firmware is uploaded to the
device that provokes such unpredictable behavior, the device may become locked into an
unusable state. This is referred to as “bricking” the device. If a device becomes bricked,
there may be no easy way to recover it. For example, the code on the device that controls
firmware uploads may never be reachable in a bricked state, making it impossible to update
to a known good version. To recover from such a state, a hardware debugger is used as
discussed in Section 2.4.4. For this reason, during initial testing it is important to limit the
extent to which modifications are performed and, if feasible, be prepared for testing with
multiple physical copies of the target device.
3.5.2

Demonstration.

Given a tested and validated solution implemented to take advantage of design
weaknesses in the derived firmware update validation method, a demonstration of
counterfeit firmware is presented. The demonstration is intended to verify the weaknesses
inherent in common controllers as well as validate the threats they pose. The demonstration
first creates a valid firmware image containing customized functionality. Relevant functions
in the firmware are sought by searching through the recovered symbol names. Once
relevant sections of code are identified, modifications are made to achieve the desired
e↵ect. As described by Peck and Peterson [44], care should be taken to minimize the
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collateral damage caused by the modifications in order to improve the chance that the
modified firmware still functions as expected. After the modifications are performed, the
implemented solution is applied to the counterfeit firmware image, resulting in a valid
custom image as shown in testing. The demonstration proceeds to upload the counterfeit
firmware to the test environment device. This process is again accomplished through the
use of the vendor-supplied firmware update software in the same manner as any legitimate
firmware update. If the device enters a faulted state, then the counterfeit firmware failed.
Otherwise, if the counterfeit firmware is confirmed as running on the device and performing
its altered function correctly, then the firmware is successfully counterfeited, achieving the
goals of the demonstration.
3.6

Summary
In an e↵ort to advance detection and analysis research in the area of secure PLC

firmware, this research intends to determine the feasibility of a counterfeit firmware attack
on a common PLC. It is proposed that such an attack is possible due to insecurely designed
firmware update validation methods. A compilation of relevant practices and procedures is
described for deriving the firmware update validation method and considerations regarding
its advantages and limitations are discussed.

Following this, the derived method is

confirmed and analyzed while a demonstration of any design weaknesses is provided,
allowing for counterfeit firmware to be uploaded and executed on the test device.
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IV.

Reversing Process, Testing, and Demonstration

This chapter describes in detail the process followed to reverse engineer the firmware
update validation method of the Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61. After acquiring and
completely disassembling the device firmware, techniques to derive the firmware update
validation method are explored and assessed. Any weaknesses in the derived method are
taken advantage of and verified through a demonstrated counterfeiting of firmware on the
test system.
4.1

Reversing Process
4.1.1

Firmware Acquisition.

Firmware samples are first sought directly from the manufacturer. A search of
the vendor website reveals numerous ControlLogix L61 OS firmware update packages
available for download from Rockwell Automation. The firmware revision number (FRN)s
available range from the newest, FRN 20.013, to what is presumably the oldest officially
supported version for the targeted L61 Series B device, FRN 12.042. For completeness, all
19 available versions are procured.
Once the firmware updates are downloaded, the firmware binary images are extracted
from the update package.

In the case of ControlLogix updates, the downloaded

packages are zip-compressed files containing a Windows installer (.msi extension) for
the ControlFlash utility as well as a text file named CONTENTS.TXT. Using the FRN
19.011 update package as an example, opening the CONTENTS.TXT file in a text editor
reveals a list of “script filenames” for each CPU module model number supported by this
update. In this case, only one script file is mentioned: PN-86270.nvs. Next, the 7-Zip file
compression utility is used to view the contents of the ControlFLASH.msi installer file.
Located inside are several cabinet files (.cab extension). A search is performed over each
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.cab file for the “PN-86270.nvs” filename listed in CONTENTS.TXT. This file is found
inside the NVS.CAB file. This archive contains a series of subdirectories that, in the lowest
directory, contains three files: PN-86270.nvs, PN-86270.RES, and PN-86272.bin. Since
PN-86272.bin is the largest of the three and the .bin extension implies a binary file, it is a
candidate for the firmware image.
It is noted that not all of the downloaded firmware updates follow the structure pattern
outlined here. Several older FRN updates contain an executable setup file and an unfamiliar
virtual disk-like archive. Since this only applies to 4 of the oldest updates from the total 19
available, they are excluded from the reversing process in order to focus on the newer and
more immediately accessible firmware images.
4.1.2

Binary File Analysis.

4.1.2.1

Manual Inspection.

After obtaining multiple OS firmware images, a visual inspection is performed
manually on a sample image. This case continues to use FRN 19.011. Note, however,
that the purpose of this step is to identify general format characteristics of the firmware
common to the test device. Therefore, any available version is sufficient for this step based
on its inherent format required by the device. The manual inspection begins by examining
the files contained in NVS.CAB. Since PN-86272.bin is the candidate firmware image,
the other two files are first examined to ascertain their relevance. Opening the .nvs file
in a text editor reveals a configuration script for the update (see Appendix B.1). Relevant
information contained in this file includes: version number, number of updates, a list of
eligible devices, starting location for the update, firmware file size, and firmware filename.
This configuration file accurately identifies the firmware binary file as PN-86272.bin and
confirms its size. Opening PN-86270.RES in the HxD binary file editor as illustrated in
Figure 4.1 presents 4 bytes of data, which are later determined to represent ControlFlash
restrictions on the firmware binary (see Section 4.3.2).
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Figure 4.1: Contents of PN-86270.RES in HxD.

The firmware image file PN-86272.bin, seen in Figure 4.2, is next examined using
HxD. The first goal is to assess the general structure of the binary file by identifying
any encrypted or compressed section. If such sections exist, additional work involving
decryption or decompression is performed before continuing the reversing process.
Observations made with the sample image indicate that there exist no immediately visible
compressed or encrypted sections. This is determined by a marked lack of randomness in
the bytes of the image as shown in Figure 4.2. Furthermore, several American Standard
Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) strings are readily visible in the binary file.
Therefore, the general structure of the image is indicative of raw binary code and data.
An inspection beginning with the first bytes in the file reveals possible header information.
Specifically, the first 7 to 8 32-bit words of the image are of interest due to the existence of
the string “xV4” and the relatively high density of 0s, especially in the 7th word, which is
entirely 0.
4.1.2.2

Binary Comparison.

Having determined a possible header and discovered that the firmware binary is
likely not compressed or encrypted, binary comparisons are performed on the firmware
files. Using the Visual Binary Di↵ (VBinDi↵) binary file di↵erence utility, two firmware
images are loaded at a time while VBinDi↵ highlights any di↵erences that are present. In
order to identify dynamic sections of the firmware, two similar firmware images are first
sought. Consecutive firmware versions are expected to have many similarities, so working
backwards from the most recent FRN available, every two consecutive version pairs are
compared for similarities. Considering that the size of the firmware images ranges from
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Figure 4.2: Beginning of FRN19.011 binary in HxD.

roughly 2MB to 3MB, it is not feasible to identify and compare each and every di↵erence.
Instead, firmware image similarity is evaluated based on the quantity of di↵erences visible
at the beginning and end of the the files as well as the magnitude of di↵erence in file
lengths. To accurately compare the end of the files, the last bytes in the files are aligned
in VBinDi↵ to correct for variations in length. Not only does such evaluation simplify the
comparison process, but the beginning and ends of the firmware images are most likely to
contain information relevant to the entire image as opposed to random code instructions
contained in the middle. Examples of this are commonly witnessed in many data structure
implementations as headers and footers including the portable executable (PE) file format,
Ethernet frames, and VxWorks-based firmware images [26, 37, 44]. The two most similar
firmware versions discovered following this method of comparison are FRN 16.081 and
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FRN 16.057. Note that these two versions are the only two firmware versions available
with the same length. Furthermore, the number of byte-di↵erences between the two totals
only 14 throughout their entire files.

Figure 4.3: VBinDi↵ of the beginning of FRN20.013 and FRN13.071.

A comparison is also performed on two dissimilar versions to determine what static
fields are present. Optimal dissimilarity is defined as the greatest possible number of
byte-di↵erences between two valid firmware images of given lengths. Given two such
dissimilar images, bytes that remain unchanged between them represent static data that
is likely constant across most firmware versions. For this comparison, however, optimal
dissimilarity is not mandatory. To simplify comparison, the process considers that the
newest and oldest available firmware versions are dissimilar to a degree sufficient in
identifying static fields. For the given test environment, these versions are FRN 20.013
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and FRN 13.071, respectively. Loading these two files into VBinDi↵ shows that much of
the expected header is the same (see Figure 4.3). These static fields include the entire 3rd,
4th, and 7th words, with only one byte di↵ering in each of the 5th and 6th words. An
examination of the end of these two files first length aligns the last bytes in each file. This
comparison reveals no significant similarities.
As a result of comparing the various firmware images, noticeable patterns arise. For
example, the 3rd, 4th, and 7th words of the header remain constant. In addition, the second
word is identified as containing the firmware version number of each image: the first byte
represents the major revision number, the second is the minor revision number, and the
third is the subrevision number found in the accompanying .nvs file. However, none of
the header values directly relate to the file’s length. Through review of the dynamic fields
revealed by FRN 16.081 and FRN 16.057, the last 8 bytes of every firmware image are
found to always di↵er in an apparently random fashion (see Figure C.2). This is strong
evidence that these trailing 8 bytes represent a validation value.
4.1.2.3

Embedded File and Filesystem Analysis.

Following manual and comparative analysis, the target firmware is now analyzed for
embedded files or filesystems. This is accomplished by searching the firmware binary
for byte signatures matching file or filesystem types of interest.

Based on previous

work discussed in Section 2.4, such types commonly encountered in similar applications
include zlib, gzip, or Lempel-Ziv-Markov chain algorithm (LZMA) compressed files and
compressed ROM file system (cramfs), SquashFS, Journalling Flash File System version
2 (JFFS2), or Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS) filesystems, which commonly
incorporate the former compression schemes. Previous works by Santamarta and Peck
utilize an automated tool to perform this type of analysis called Deezee [44, 52]. However,
Deezee only searches specifically for zlib-compressed sections, so this research employs
the BinWalk binary analysis tool capable of detecting all of the above [23]. From this point
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forward, FRN 16.081 is the firmware image targeted by this e↵ort. This selection is made
based on its similarity to another version (FRN 16.057) as well as the fact that, at over 1MB
smaller than the newest firmware, there is significantly less data to analyze. The decision is
made based on the assumption that this size advantage comes with no significant variation
regarding implementation of the validation method or other firmware features critical to
operation.
As a command line tool, Binwalk requires a firmware binary file as an argument for
execution. Given the sample firmware image, Binwalk is instructed to search for the above
signatures. The result of this analysis reveals 6 gzip file candidates and approximately 170
zlib file candidates. Binwalk identifies the gzip file candidates as 3 icon files and 3 .eds
files (see Figure 4.4). The .eds extension signifies a configuration file used by Rockwell
devices to identify themselves to control software such as RSLinx or RSLogix. Binwalk
does not identify corresponding filenames for the zlib results; therefore, they are analyzed
using a custom script and an open-source zlib compression utility (see Appendix E.1 and
Reference [2], respectively). The script extracts all zlib containers identified by Binwalk
from the firmware image and attempts to decompress them, returning only those that
successfully decompress. This method determines that only 4 out of the approximately
170 original hits are valid zlib containers. A manual inspection of these remaining 4 yields
no significant information. None of the resulting files are greater than 8 bytes in length.
With no filesystems identified, these results indicate that, except for the identified gzip files,
the firmware image is raw binary code and data.
4.1.3

Firmware Disassembly.

4.1.3.1

Processor Determination and Disassembly.

Before loading the firmware image into IDA to automate disassembly, the target
processor type is determined. Using Skochinsky’s presentation [53], the firmware binary
as viewed in HxD is compared to di↵erent target processor code samples. This comparison
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Figure 4.4: List of gzip file candidates identified by Binwalk.

of instruction signatures indicates that the firmware targets an ARM processor. As an
alternative to this method, a physical examination of the hardware also confirms that the
target processor is an ARM (see Appendix D).
IDA provides two di↵erent ARM targets: one based on little-endian byte ordering and
the other based on big-endian. The little-endian target processor is initially selected, as
indicated by the Skochinsky code samples. This results in the automatic disassembly of
several functions in the binary, indicating the correct determination of the target processor.
For comparison, the big-endian target is also attempted, but IDA fails to disassemble any
code, confirming that the target is little-endian. Figure 4.5 illustrates the initial status
of the binary image disassembly in IDA, where blue represents successfully identified
and disassembled functions, red represents unknown disassembly code, gray represents
identified data sections, and brown represents unexplored sections of the image.

Figure 4.5: Initial IDA disassembly status.
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4.1.3.2

Rebuilding Functions.

IDA is not able to completely disassemble the firmware binary and a significant
portion of the binary image remains unexplored by the automated tool. Therefore, the IDA
script file provided by Santamarta [51] manually instructs IDA to explore the remaining
functions. In order to apply this script to the firmware, it is modified for use on the ARM
architecture by searching for the appropriate ARM function prologues (see Appendix F.1).
Identified functions from the code IDA natively disassembles are examined to determine
their prologue signature. All such functions automatically identified by IDA begin with a
store multiple with full descending stack address mode (STMFD) instruction that pushes
current register values to the stack. The exact registers pushed to the stack vary, but the
two most significant bytes of the instruction remain constant: 0xE9 0x2D. A review of
the ARM Procedure Call Standard specified in the ARM Software Development Toolkit
Reference Guide confirms that this instruction is a standard prologue for ARM functions
[4]. Furthermore, a review of the ARM instruction encoding standard confirms that for
this particular instruction, the most significant two bytes are always 0xE9 0x2D [6]. With
Santamarta’s IDA script modified to target this signature and corrected for endianness, the
script is applied to the loaded firmware binary. As a result, the IDA status visualization
bar confirms that a significantly greater majority of the binary is explored with functions
identified (see Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: IDA status after function identification.

4.1.3.3

Determining Base Address.

Determining the base address is the next step followed in the process. The “load
immediate” technique is used initially given that there exist immediate address references
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in the disassembly. A search of all load register (LDR) instructions referencing immediate
values determines that the majority of such references consist of addresses in the range
of 0x10000 to 0x30000. The assumption that these addresses reference locations in the
firmware implies a base address of 0. However, the firmware is currently loaded at a base
of 0 and no immediate addresses reference the beginning of functions or strings. Therefore,
they do not reference sections of the firmware. Based on the volume of such references,
the address range is significant, but the significance is unknown.
After the complete search of immediate values present in LDR instructions, other
common address bases are identified including (in descending order of approximate
commonness): 0x08000000, 0x00C00000, 0x0B000000, 0x00E00000, and 0x60000000.
Recall that the starting location referenced in the .nvs file accompanying the firmware is
0x0B160000. Given that this location is titled as “starting location” and falls within the
range of several immediate values in the general 0x0B000000 base, it is incorporated
as the true base address. In IDA, the firmware is rebased at the new address. No
significant changes in the disassembled code are immediately visible. However, many
instructions in the given firmware use relative addresses independent of the base address,
so significant changes are not expected. For the same reason, even proceeding with an
incorrect base address does not technically hamper the reversing process. The majority
of instructions utilize relative addressing, so function interactions and operations remain
consistent regardless of the base address. However, knowledge of the true base address
is still critical in understanding the firmware as a whole. While many of the function
references remain correct, working with an incorrect base address may lead to inaccurate
interpretations of segments referenced by immediate addresses.
4.1.3.4

Inspecting Strings.

In order to gain as much information as possible from the firmware image, an
inspection of all ASCII strings contained in the image is performed. IDA provides a
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subview to list all strings in the loaded binary. Alternatively, the UNIX strings command
provides equivalent functionality, only without the support of IDA disassembly. A manual
inspection of the list reveals several Extensible Markup Language (XML) strings. A review
of official documentation from Rockwell Automation determines that these strings are
related to the use of CompactFlash memory cards as storage for project files [50].
Also discovered is a set of strings indicative of ARM compiler versions used to build
the firmware (see Figure 4.7). These strings indicate both that Rockwell uses standard
ARM development tools as well as the time period of original firmware development. For
comparison, a search of the newest firmware, FRN 20.013, for strings containing “ARM”
produces one result for “ARM ADS1.2 [Build 848].” This indicates that development tool
information is simplified in newer revisions, but remains present.

Figure 4.7: ARM compiler version string.

Another string in the firmware refers to a multiple-precision math library (see
Figure 4.8). A similar string in the associated .nvs file, refers to this library by the name
BigDigits (see Appendix B.1). Since official documentation for BigDigits specifically
describes its use in cryptographic applications, the inclusion of this string indicates possible
cryptographic functionality present in the firmware [18]. This exact string remains present
in FRN 20.013.

Figure 4.8: BigDigits library copyright string.

49

Furthermore, a string containing an apparently random combination of hexadecimal
characters (i.e., 0-9 and a-f) is also present in the firmware. This string is 128 characters
(bytes) long, or 1024 bits, a common key length used for Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA)
encryption schemes. In fact, 1024 bits is the suggested key length used for RSA in
corporate or medium-security environments during the time frame of the release of the
ControlLogix L61. However, the NIST no longer recommends the use of 1024-bit RSA
keys through 2013 and expressly prohibits its usage thereafter [8]. If this string does
represent an RSA key, it is possible the BigDigits library is included in the firmware to
implement the encryption scheme. Whether or not this is related to the firmware update
validation method is unknown at this point in the process. Of significance, this exact string
is still present in FRN 20.013.
Considering that one goal of string inspection is to identify symbol strings in concert
with discovering symbol tables, the existence of apparent source filename strings in the
firmware is significant. For example, one such string reads “..\\..\\Source\\acmain.c.” In
addition, strings representing apparent data structures are also present. These strings exist
in blocks organized with a structure name followed by attributes (see Figure 4.9). The exact
format of these data structures remains unknown.

Figure 4.9: OUTPUT COMPENSATION data structure strings.

4.1.3.5

Rebuilding Symbols.

To rebuild symbols in the firmware, there are two basic requirements: symbol names
and a way to associate those names with the functions they belong to. As determined
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by the string inspection, there exist a number of source code filenames in the firmware. A
further inspection of these strings, however, reveals that they are not located in one common
section of the binary. Instead of being located in a symbol table, the source filenames are
distributed throughout the firmware image. While this discovery hampers the reversing
e↵orts, the fact that file names are available is significant.
During disassembly, IDA automatically creates cross references between string
addresses and the addresses of any instructions that reference them. Using these cross
references, instructions referring to several of the source filename strings are investigated
and compared. This reveals that all of the strings are used in the same manner: they are
passed in as parameters to a common function. An example is shown in Figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Example symbol string usage.

A brief exploration of this common function reveals a series of calls that apparently
never return.

The observed behavior closely resembles the exception or assertion

functionality mentioned by Skochinsky [53]. For this reason, the function is manually
renamed “exception call” in IDA. While this information does not provide a direct
mapping of names to functions as a symbol table does, it is possible to infer the source
filename of any function making an exception call. However, when multiple functions
making exception calls are contained in the same source file, the filename arguments passed
to exception call are identical. Thus, there is not a one-to-one mapping of names to
functions, but a one-to-many mapping. As a consequence of the same issue, the names
available are less descriptive and specific than individual function names provided by a
symbol table.

51

Since the source filename strings are distributed throughout the firmware, the process
of naming their related functions is less straightforward, but still automatable with a script
(see Appendix F.2). Every function referencing each filename string is identified using
the IDA cross reference database. The script then renames the functions according to the
referenced filename. Duplicates are commonly encountered in this process and handled by
adding generic numerical suffixes to each function name.
4.1.4

Derivation of Firmware Update Validation Method.

4.1.4.1

Disassembly Analysis.

Reverse engineering the validation method from disassembled code begins by
considering the general functionality of validation algorithms in order to determine relevant
patterns and structures in the disassembled code. For instance, the validation algorithm is
known to inherently perform a computation over the contents of the firmware; therefore,
the code calculating the validation likely contains a loop performing an operation over a
range of memory addresses. Furthermore, the specific operations performed in that loop
are implied by the type of algorithm used for validation.
As Section 2.4.5 discusses, two common types of algorithms used for validation
methods are the modular summation and CRC algorithms.

While numerous other

algorithms exist that a validation method may implement, the possible configurations are
countably infinite. Therefore in the interest of pragmatism, the two candidates above are
considered the primary candidates due to their popularity in related applications. A modular
summation algorithm adds each n bit word of the target data together to create a checksum
value. For such an algorithm, the main validation loop should contain an addition operation
executed over each word in the image. A CRC, however, should implement a more
complicated set of operations that includes the use of an XOR instruction. While the use
of an XOR instruction is not guaranteed depending on the exact coded implementation, it
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remains a computationally inexpensive instruction and a common method of implementing
the CRC calculation [46].
Given these considerations, the list of firmware functions is searched for names
relevant to any checksum algorithm possibly used for validation. Once an apparently
relevant function is identified, the surrounding disassembly is examined for operational
flow indicative of such an algorithm. One example of a function discovered in this
manner is identified by the “cmCS.c” source filename. Since the “CS” abbreviation in
the file name may indicate “checksum,” the function is explored. However, an analysis
of the disassembly reveals no operational flows indicative of a checksum calculation, so
the function is deemed not significant. Several other strings are discovered following
this process including the binary file extension “.bin,” a set of functions referencing the
“Encryption.c” source filename, a large set of “up” functions including source filenames
“upexec.c” and “upprog.c,” and the “ReUpLockForUpdate.c” function set. Again, these
functions are examined based on possible relevance of their names, but while general
information regarding their operation is gained, no specific information regarding the
firmware update validation method method is discovered.
During this process, the first word in the firmware image is discovered to contain a
branch instruction. IDA is instructed to treat this location as the beginning of a function,
revealing initialization code at the branch target location. This initialization code is
followed and analyzed for over one thousand instructions, however, no code related to
the functionality of the validation method is discovered. Considering that a CRC, if
present, likely uses an exclusive or instruction (represented as “EOR” in ARM assembly),
another tactic attempted is a direct search of the disassembly for all EOR instructions.
At 263 occurrences, the number of results returned by this search is too numerous to
exhaustively analyze, but several of the results containing loop structures are explored.
However, no code relevant to the validation method is discovered. Since the validation
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method remains to be located among the disassembled functions of the OS firmware, other
available approaches are explored.
4.1.4.2

Black Box Testing.

For black box testing, incremental alterations of firmware are tested on the device to
gain information regarding its operation. Since the true firmware update validation method
is present on the device, the success of a particular tactic can only reliably be determined
by modifying the firmware, uploading it to the device, and assessing the result. Anytime
modifications are made at such a low level, there exists a significant risk of bricking
the device. Although it may be possible to recover the device with hardware debugging
methods, such ability is not guaranteed. This hazard presents a challenge to reversing
e↵orts by restricting the modifications that can be safely attempted while minimizing the
risk of harm to the device. If multiple physical sample devices exist for such testing, the
threat posed is less severe, but prohibitively expensive; damage is ideally avoided.
To begin black box e↵orts, two pieces of information are required: the location of the
checksum value in the firmware and the range of data the validation method covers. It is
not guaranteed that the validation method strictly covers the range of the first byte of the
binary image to the last. As determined in Section 4.1.2.2, the candidate location of the
checksum value is the last 8 bytes of the image. To determine the range of bytes covered by
the validation method, various bytes of the firmware image are modified such that a series
of modified firmware uploads indicates whether the modified bytes are validated.
Boundary Checking. Ideally, the suspected validation boundaries are tested systematically by changing and testing each and every byte in the image. However, one caveat to
this strategy is the risk of bricking the device. Certain bytes that are ideally tested throughout the image are critical to the proper operation of the firmware. Section 4.1.4.1 shows
that the first 4 bytes of the firmware image represent a branch instruction to the OS initialization code. If the first byte of the firmware is modified and it passes validation, the OS
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should theoretically fail to initialize properly. To avoid this behavior potentially bricking
the device, boundary checking modifications skip such critical bytes. Instead, the nearest
non-critical bytes are targeted under the assumption that any adjacent critical bytes are included in the validation range. In this case, the first non-critical byte of the firmware is the
5th, or the first byte of the version number in the header. Starting at the 5th byte, modifications are made incrementally to each byte in the firmware. Initially, the first version byte is
incremented by 1 and the modified firmware is uploaded to the device with ControlFlash.
This results in a failed validation after the image is uploaded; therefore, the version number
byte is included in the validation.
Since the process of boundary checking requires the firmware to be updated at every
test point, it is not feasible to check every non-critical byte in the firmware. Not only
must the criticality of every byte be determined manually, but the firmware upload process
is slow. For each update, the binary is pushed to the device in a process that takes several
minutes. If the upload is successful, the device proceeds to restart itself. Even if the process
is automated using a custom flash program, the time required to write images to the device
alone takes a prohibitive amount of time to allow a thorough check of every non-critical
byte. For this reason, this process continues by checking only the likely boundaries. These
include the beginning and end of the header and the beginning and end of the main code
section, excluding the 8 byte checksum value. In addition, several arbitrarily chosen noncritical bytes in the middle of the firmware are also selected and tested. The results for all
such checks are the same: all modifications are detected by the validation method resulting
in a failed update. This evidence strongly suggests that the validation method in use is
dependent on every byte of the firmware image.
Common Checksum Algorithms. Given this evidence, a number of common
checksum algorithms are applied to the firmware image. The binary file used in these tests
is the FRN 16.081 image with the last 8 bytes removed in order to exclude the checksum
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value from the calculations. HxD features the ability to calculate many common hashes
over a file. The following available algorithms are applied to the test file: checksum-8
(checksum here refers to a modular summation), checksum-16, checksum-32, checksum64, CRC-32, CRC-64, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, message digest (MD)-2,
MD-4, and MD-5. The results of these calculations are compared to the actual checksum
value of the firmware. Comparisons are made based on any observable similarities between
the HxD calculated values and the true checksum value. Considering that most of the
algorithms applied produce results of di↵ering lengths from the 64-bit firmware checksum
value, any apparent similarities are potentially significant. In this case, however, no
similarities are observed.
Since the target processor for the firmware operates in little-endian mode, a second
attempt is made to repeat this procedure after converting the test file to big-endian byte
ordering. Afterwards, the same algorithms above are again applied to the new big-endian
version of the test image. However, this makes no apparent di↵erence in the comparison of
similarities with the original firmware checksum value. An investigation is next initiated
specifically on the two common candidate algorithms: the modular summation and the
CRC. In a modular summation implementation, the checksum value is directly dependent
on the value of each n-bit word before it, so a di↵erence of 1 in any given word translates
directly to a di↵erence of 1 in the calculated checksum value. This characteristic enables a
method of determining whether a modular summation algorithm is in use or not.
The target of the di↵erence-of-1 modification is the first non-critical byte in firmware
that occurs in the least significant position of a word. With a standard modular summation
algorithm, a di↵erence of 1 in such a byte results is a di↵erence of 1 in the corresponding
least significant byte of the checksum value. Since endianness and word size of the
checksum value are unknown, two target bytes are chosen to be modified: the first byte
and last byte of a 64-bit aligned word. The first byte addresses the little-endian 32 and
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64-bit possibilities while the last byte addresses the big-endian 32 and 64-bit possibilities.
One at a time, these values are modified by an increment of 1. For each of these two cases,
4 di↵erent bytes in the checksum value are tested: the first and last bytes of each 32-bit
word. Again, this covers the possibilities that the true checksum value is either 32-bit
or 64-bit and big or little-endian. Additionally, in the case that the true checksum value
is only 32-bits, this checks both possible word positions for the 32-bit value. For each of
these possibilities, the checksum value byte is also incremented by 1. Figure 4.11 illustrates
the 8 total test cases present, 2 firmware modification cases for each of 4 checksum value
modification cases. Each of these test cases is uploaded to the device using ControlFlash.
All 8 firmware test cases fail validation; therefore, it is concluded that the checksum method
is not a simple modular summation.
Original test values:

Original checksum values:

Test Cases:

Figure 4.11: Modular summation test cases with changes highlighted.
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Brute Forcing CRC.

As Section 2.4.5 describes, a CRC is based on a number of

customizable parameters including bit width, polynomial value, initial checksum value,
final XOR value, and endianness. Gregory Cook provides a command line tool for
calculating and determining CRCs with arbitrary parameters [15]. This tool, called CRC
RevEng or RevEng, is applied to determine if a CRC algorithm configuration is used for
validation. RevEng includes a database of common CRC models. In total, there are 64
di↵erent default CRC configurations including nine 32-bit models and three 64-bit models.
The search functionality in RevEng checks all known models of the specified width against
multiple specified sample files. If a match is not found in one of the default models, a
brute force search is initiated through all possible model configurations. Sample input files
are required to be in the format of message data followed immediately by the checksum
value of the specified width. With minimum knowledge of the true model’s parameters, the
model width and and at least three input samples are specified such that at least two of the
samples are identical in length and at least two di↵er in length.
To test the ControlLogix L61 firmware for a CRC algorithm, seven unique test cases
are established. All cases are based on the same three firmware samples: FRN 16.081,
FRN 16.057, and FRN 16.022. These satisfy the minimum sample criteria since FRN
16.081 and FRN 16.057 are the same length while FRN 16.022 di↵ers in length. The
first case supposes a 64-bit width and little-endian byte ordering. The exact manner in
which RevEng or the device validation method handle little-endian byte ordering for 64-bit
width models is unknown, but hypothetically RevEng may operate based on 64-bit little
endian words while the device checksum operates on two 32-bit little endian words, or vice
versa. For the former case, the files are left unmodified since their format already follows
the data-plus-checksum format required. However, to ensure the data is treated properly
for the latter, new firmware sample files are created where each two–32-bit word pair in
the original samples are swapped. This ensures that at least one of the two variations is
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processed by RevEng in the same manner as the device checksum. The next test case,
64-bit width big-endian, also uses the unmodified firmware files since big-endian does not
change the e↵ective word ordering.
The remaining test cases all assume a 32-bit width. Since the checksum value at the
end of the image is 64-bits, these cases assume only one of the two 32-bit words is a
CRC value; the other must represent something else. As such, there are two possibilities
for which 32-bit word represents the CRC value and for each of those, two possibilities for
endianness. The three sample firmware image files are appropriately modified by removing
the first 32-bit word of the checksum value for the first case and the second 32-bit word
for the second case. Endianness has no e↵ect on the sample files themselves for the 32bit width, only when executing RevEng must it be specified. These four combinations in
addition to the three above constitute the seven cases tested (see Figure 4.12).

reveng
reveng
reveng
reveng
reveng
reveng
reveng

-w
-w
-w
-w
-w
-w
-w

64
64
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32
32
32
32

-l
-l
-s
-l
-s
-l
-s

-s
-s
-f
-s
-f
-s
-f

-f PN-66834.bin PN-66830.bin PN-70325.bin
-f PN-66834_word_swapped.bin PN-66830_word_swapped.bin PN-70325_word_swapped.bin
PN-66834.bin PN-66830.bin PN-70325.bin
-f PN-66834_first.bin PN-66830_first.bin PN-70325_first.bin
PN-66834_first.bin PN-66830_first.bin PN-70325_first.bin
-f PN-66834_second.bin PN-66830_second.bin PN-70325_second.bin
PN-66834_second.bin PN-66830_second.bin PN-70325_second.bin

Figure 4.12: Terminal commands for RevEng search cases.

Since the default models are checked first, RevEng returns the matching model almost
immediately if a match is found. However, none of the test cases match any default
model, so RevEng continues to run through its brute force test. RevEng does not include
functionality to check the search progress, so after 24 hours of constant runtime, the
processes are terminated with no results. Since RevEng is open source, the source code is
modified to include progress indication by printing the current attempted polynomial value
upon entering the Control+Z key combination. RevEng tests polynomials incrementally,

59

so this value provides a direct indication of the program’s progress. RevEng is run again on
one of the test cases to obtain a rough approximation of the rate of search progression.
The search is run for 15 minutes on an Intel Core i7 processor running at 2.3 GHz.
The Control+Z key combination is pressed at 5, 10, and 15 minutes. Averaging the
returned polynomial values over the given time intervals results in a linear progression
of approximately 10,000 polynomials checked per minute. At this rate, a search for a 64bit polynomial with 264 combinations, would take approximately 3.5 billion years. A 32-bit
polynomial search with 232 combinations is shorter, but would still take approximately 10
months. These time requirements alone are impractical before taking into consideration
the additional calculations required to determine initial checksum and final XOR values.
Although RevEng is currently not parallelized, even a highly parallelized version running
on more advanced hardware would take a significant amount of time. Depending on time
and cost constraints, a 32-bit parallelized search may be possible, but a 64-bit search is not.
4.1.4.3

Hardware Debugging.

In this section, the alternative of hardware debugging is explored. The underlying
operation of the device hardware and firmware is first considered. General information
about how the device handles firmware is gained from the attempted firmware updates
through this process. Initially, the device is received from the manufacturer loaded with
only a base firmware (FRN 1.010). This base firmware provides basic functionality to
allow for the device to be updated with a true OS firmware, allowing proper operation [49].
When updating with ControlFlash, the device enters a special state while firmware is
pushed to it. Upon receipt of the entire firmware image, the device immediately validates
it. If the image passes validation, the device automatically resets itself and boots into the
new OS. However, if the image fails validation, the device enters an error, or faulted, state
where it requires a physical reset by cycling the power. When the device restarts, it reverts
back to the base firmware (FRN 1.010). This same behavior is observed whether updating
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from the base firmware to an OS version or from one OS version to another. Even if an
OS is already installed, a bad update reverts the device to the base firmware. This implies
that flashing a new OS image overwrites the previous OS before validation is attempted.
Since the determination on whether to boot into the OS or the base firmware is made on a
hard reset, there must exist loader code on the device with the ability to determine which
image to execute. This may be accomplished either via checking a “valid” flag stored in
non-volatile memory or a direct validation of the OS image on each startup.
The existence of such a loader with the ability to validate firmware on its own
provides another possible target to reverse engineer the validation method. Furthermore,
it is possible that in order to update the firmware, the OS running in memory makes the
equivalent of a system call to the loader or base firmware to perform the actual validation.
Indeed, the loader or base firmware may completely handle the firmware update process.
The validation method used on the OS may not even be present in the OS firmware image.
Regardless, either the loader or base firmware contain the validation method, otherwise an
OS firmware update is not possible in the first place. Since the underlying binary of these
code segments is not openly available through updates like the OS, hardware debugging
techniques are used to access them directly on the device.
Locating JTAG Ports. Since JTAG is the common standard for hardware debugging
interfaces, the device is physically examined for possible JTAG TAPs. After physically
disassembling the device to access the circuit board, unknown and unused connectors are
targeted first for investigation. For the ControlLogix L61, there are no unused connectors
present on the board, so the search moves on to empty solder pads and test points. A
number of unused solder pads are present, but in order to identify them as JTAG TAPs,
their corresponding signals must be verified. Since the device is ARM-based, a search is
conducted for standard ARM JTAG pinouts. Two common ARM JTAG configurations
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available are 20-pin and 14-pin layouts.

One apparent empty connector pad on the

controller board also has 14 pins, so it is a prime candidate for a JTAG interface.
An initial visual inspection finds no signs that any of the solder pads of the candidate
connector trace to any non-IC components other than a resistor. A multimeter is now
used to test the pinout signals of the candidate. Ground and power signals are the most
straightforward to identify, so the pins are tested against ground and power while their
layout is compared to the 14-pin ARM JTAG reference pinout. All 8 combined power and
ground pins correspond between the reference pinout and the candidate connector pads,
providing initial evidence that the empty connector is for JTAG. The other candidate pins
should also be confirmed using Breeuwsma’s process [10], but in practice this is difficult.
When the controller is fully assembled for operation as required by the remainder of
Breeuwsma’s method, the candidate TAPs are inaccessible to manual probing. To access
them, lead wires must be soldered directly to the candidate points.
Further manual analysis is performed first in an attempt to more easily confirm
the candidate pads as TAPs.

Reliably tracing pins on a multi-layer circuit board is

challenging without expensive equipment or tedious point-testing and luck. However, a
visual inspection of the candidate pads determines that the pad coinciding with the system
reset pin (nSRST) of the 14-pin ARM JTAG reference pinout is connected to a pull-up
resistor. Since nSRST is active low, this is an appropriate configuration. Unless the nSRST
pin is grounded, the pull-up resistor pulls the nSRST signal high by default; thus, the system
is defaulted to not reset. This evidence further supports that the pinout is a 14-pin ARM
JTAG connector and implies that an attempted connection to the device through JTAG is
safe for the hardware. To connect physically, a connector is fabricated and soldered to the
candidate TAP connector pads. Through this physical link, an attempt is made to connect
to the device using the hardware debugger. The primary purpose of this is to verify that the
TAP signal pins are correctly identified.
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Debugger Configuration.

The ARM RealView ICE device together with the ARM

Development Studio 5 (DS-5) software are used to debug the controller. Using the soldered
connector, the ControlLogix L61 is connected to the ICE hardware. Initial configuration is
required with DS-5 regarding the specifics of the target processor. The ControlLogix L61
uses a custom ARM processor with exceeding rare documentation. However, the provided
RealView ICE configuration utility is able to automatically detect the target core of an
attached ARM processor. In this case, the automatic configuration identifies the core as an
ARM7TDMI. The successful detection of the processor core confirms that the connector
in use is a JTAG interface to the device and the TAPs have been correctly identified.
After initial configuration, the DS-5 target database is updated to include the new target
configuration. This is accomplished with a command line utility provided by DS-5. After
updating the database, DS-5 is configured to connect with the target device by creating a
new debugger instance and setting the target type as the controller’s newly added entry to
the configuration database.
With the debugger configured, the first attempts are made to connect to the target.
The connections succeed, but the device cannot be stopped for debugging. When a stop
command is given, the controller enters a faulted state and becomes unresponsive, requiring
a manual restart. An attempt to connect immediately after a manual reset determines that
execution on the controller can only be stopped before the OS finishes booting. This means
the debug connection must be made as soon as the device is powered on before the OS has
time to boot. The cause of this anomaly remains unconfirmed, but a possible explanation
is that halting the processor while the OS is running triggers a fail-safe response from a
watchdog timer. While the processor is halted, the watchdog timer is not properly fed, so
a fault is triggered when the timer expires in an attempt to prevent unsafe operation of the
system.
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Memory Image Acquisition and Analysis. Once connected to the debugger and
halted, execution on the device is stopped in its pre-boot state. At this point, the debugger
is used to perform a memory dump on the device. Lacking any information of the proper
mapping of device memory, as much of the 32-bit address space is dumped as the debugger
can access. A manual analysis of the acquired memory dump in HxD reveals that much of
the dumped address space repeats itself. After accounting for duplicated memory, several
sections of binary code are identified by searching for common ARM instruction patterns.
The OS firmware is found among these code segments in two distinct locations: one starting
at the address 0x0B1A0000 and again at address 0x00D00000. Another large code segment
is found at address 0x0B020000. The beginning of this segment contains a header of the
same format as the OS firmware. Inspection of the version number field reveals that this
segment is FRN 1.010, the base firmware.
In addition to these firmware images, two other short and unfamiliar code segments are
found: one at address 0x0A000000 and another at address 0x80000000. The two unknown
code segments are extracted from the dump and the same reversing process described in
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 is applied to them. This produces disassembled code in IDA for
functional analysis. Analysis of the 0x0A000000 segment reveals multiple source filename
strings akin to the OS firmware. Among the strings are the names “ExecLoader.s” and
“hw setup.s.” Reverse engineering of the function referencing “ExecLoader.s” in IDA
confirms that, based on its functionality, this particular segment is the executive loader.
After performing hardware initialization, ExecLoader follows a process to validate and
load the firmware into memory before handing over execution.
In this process, illustrated in Figure 4.13, ExecLoader begins by determining what, if
any, firmware is present. To accomplish this, ExecLoader first verifies the existence of base
firmware. The base address of the base firmware is hard-coded as 0x0B020000. Using this
base address, ExecLoader compares the 3rd and 4th words of the presumed base firmware
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Figure 4.13: Flow chart of ExecLoader.s.
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header. If these two values are bitwise inverses of each other, ExecLoader accepts that
a base firmware is present. If no base firmware is detected, execution on the device is
terminated in an infinite loop. However, if the presence of base firmware is confirmed,
ExecLoader continues by determining if OS firmware is present. Given the OS firmware
base address, ExecLoader performs the same check above on the 3rd and 4th words of the
presumed OS firmware header. Again, if these two values are bitwise inverses, ExecLoader
accepts that an OS firmware is present.
ExecLoader now validates the firmware. If an OS firmware is present, the validation
is performed on it; otherwise, ExecLoader defaults to validating the base firmware. The
algorithm used for validation is a variation of a modular summation. In the event an OS
firmware is present but does not pass validation, ExecLoader proceeds to validate the base
firmware. If no firmware passes validation, execution is terminated in an infinite loop.
After successful validation of the appropriate firmware, ExecLoader loads the firmware
from flash memory to RAM. To determine the address in RAM where the firmware is
loaded, ExecLoader references the 5th word of the firmware header. The firmware is copied
to this address. Afterwards, execution jumps from ExecLoader to the base address of the
loaded firmware. At this point in the process, a candidate for the firmware update validation
method is known.
4.2

Firmware Update Validation Method Analysis
4.2.1

Verification of Correctness.

The validation method checksum algorithm derived by the reversing process is now
tested for correctness. The validation algorithm is recreated in C as a command line
program called ab cksum. This program is able to validate existing firmware images
and is applied to all available firmware versions. Each of the 15 firmware versions from
FRN 20.013 to FRN 13.071 is passed to the ab cksum program. The program applies the
derived validation algorithm to the firmware binary files. All 15 firmware versions tested
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in this manner successfully pass the ab cksum validation, confirming correctness of the
algorithm.
4.2.2

Design Analysis.

Given the success of initial testing, the design of the derived validation algorithm
is analyzed for weaknesses that allow for counterfeit firmware to pass validation. The
design of the modular summation algorithm implemented by the firmware update validation
method is based on the notion that in order to be considered a valid image, the modular
summation of its contents must equal a given value. This design has several inherent
security weaknesses from the perspective of integrity and authenticity. By design, a
modular summation algorithm is meant only to validate data integrity, not authenticity.
Furthermore, the integrity of the data is only protected against accidental alteration, and
this is not completely guaranteed. Therefore, taking advantage of a modular summation
algorithm to violate data integrity and authenticity is trivial. In the specific implementation
of the ControlLogix L61, the key requirement to pass validation is to match the constant
value used by the algorithm for comparison. As long as the modular summation of the
firmware results in this constant value, the firmware is considered valid by the controller.
A solution taking advantage of this weakness is implemented in ab cksum. The goal
of the solution is to ensure that the modular summation algorithm, when applied to a given
firmware image, results in the correct constant validation value by modifying only the
checksum value field in the firmware. This is accomplished by applying the algorithm
to the firmware image, but excluding the checksum value field from the calculation. The
resulting value is then subtracted from the constant validation value, and the result is placed
in the checksum value field.
The validation design weakness is tested on the ControlLogix L61 controller using
FRN 16.081 as the baseline image. To minimize the risk of damaging the test device, the
first attempted modification does not alter the checksum value field. Instead, a modification
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resulting in a collision of checksum values is manually generated in the firmware image.
The resulting checksum value is not changed, as validated by ab cksum. To test this
solution, the firmware is uploaded to the controller using ControlFlash. After the upload
is complete, the controller restarts itself, unlike previous invalid updates, but then fails to
boot. Even after a manual reset, the device is completely unresponsive.
4.2.3

Refinement.

With the test device in an inoperable state, JTAG hardware debugging is employed to
recover the device. After connecting to the device through JTAG as previously described,
the debugger reveals that code execution on the device terminates in an infinite loop.
However, the OS firmware is still loaded into memory from flash. The DS-5 debugging
software is used to verify that the firmware loaded into memory is indeed the modified test
version by locating the modified bytes in RAM. This demonstrates the executive loader is
successfully validating the OS image and loading it into memory, but that the OS apparently
fails to correctly initialize.
The location of the error is determined by iteratively setting hardware breakpoints
in the debugger, restarting the system, and observing if the breakpoints are hit or not.
Following this process, the location of the error is reduced to one particular unidentified
function in the OS firmware. Referring to the disassembled firmware in IDA, this function
is examined and determined to contain another checksum algorithm: a CRC. This evidence
establishes that the validation performed by the executive loader is interpreted correctly, but
that a secondary validation in the OS initialization continues to hinder modification.
Iteratively repeating the testing process described above, the ab cksum utility is
revised to include the ability to validate firmware based on the discovered CRC validation
algorithm. The correctness of the updated utility is verified by passing all available
firmware versions to ab cksum. After applying both the modular summation and CRC
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algorithms to the firmware images, ab cksum reports that they all successfully pass
validation. This confirms the correctness of the revised utility.
A design analysis of the CRC algorithm determines that it su↵ers from the same
security weakness as the modular summation algorithm. Although a CRC is able to more
accurately detect accidental alterations of data than a modular summation, the CRC is not
designed to detect intentional modifications. As long as the CRC calculation implemented
in the ControlLogix L61 results in a constant value, the firmware is considered valid.
This solution is implemented in ab cksum such that, given a firmware image, the utility
performs the derived CRC validation and places the result in the CRC checksum field.
In the current case where the loaded firmware does not pass CRC validation, the
device enters a faulted state. The device is first recovered to a usable state before testing
continues. Since the modified OS firmware currently loaded on the device is able to pass
the ExecLoader validation but fails its own CRC validation, external intervention from
the hardware debugger is required for recovery. After resetting the device and connecting
through JTAG, the debugger is used to divert execution in the executive loader and directly
load the base firmware instead of the OS firmware. This is accomplished by modifying the
processor program counter when execution in ExecLoader reaches the point of detecting
OS firmware, e↵ectively acting as though no OS firmware is present. With the base
firmware temporarily running on the device, a known good OS image is uploaded to the
device in the standard manner, recovering the device to a fully operational state.
To test the refined ab cksum solution, a one-byte modification is made to the test
firmware in a non-critical location. The checksum values are recalculated using ab cksum
to replace the original values. The firmware is uploaded to the device using the standard
ControlFlash method. After the update is complete, the controller restarts and successfully
boots completely into its standard operating state. This is confirmed by the successful
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communication of the device with RSLinx device configuration software. Thus, the
validation method of the device is successfully bypassed.
4.3

Demonstration
4.3.1

Firmware Modification.

The process for firmware modification begins by reversing the firmware binary to
obtain named functions in the disassembly in exactly the same manner as previously
described. Based on the goal of the modification, the disassembly is searched for any
potentially relevant strings or function names. The following case study demonstrates the
concept. The goal in this case is to counterfeit the firmware version number FRN 16.081
to appear as FRN 20.066.099, a value higher than any currently available version number
from Rockwell.
First, the firmware is searched for any locations that reference the version number.
IDA detects no code references to the version number bytes in the header, but there
must exist a reference to version number in the code since the device reports a version
number to ControlFlash. Since FRN 16.081 only di↵ers from FRN 16.057 by 14 bytes,
the binary files of these two versions are compared. An inspection of the disassembly
surrounding di↵erences in the versions determines that one such di↵erence exists in a
function returning a hard-coded version number. Figure 4.14 highlights 4 ARM instructions
that use immediate values to calculate and store this version number. The immediate
values of these instructions are appropriately modified in HxD to represent the target
version number 20.066.099. The version number bytes in the firmware header are also
appropriately modified (see Figure 4.15), where 0x14 = 20, 0x42 = 66, and 0x63 = 99.
Using the ab cksum validation utility, the correct checksum values are calculated and
updated in the new firmware binary file. The utility then revalidates the binary to confirm
that the checksum values are correctly updated.
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Figure 4.14: Modification of FRN 16.081 version number in function to 20.066.099.

Figure 4.15: Modification of FRN 16.081 version number in header to 20.066.099.

4.3.2

Device Exploitation.

In order to use ControlFlash to upload the counterfeit firmware, adjustments are made
to the .nvs configuration file. The firmware version number is specified several times in the
configuration file, so these values are modified to reflect the counterfeited version number.
The modified firmware now appears in the ControlFlash firmware catalog list as version
20.66.99. Rockwell is inconsistent with whether subrevision numbers include a leading 0
or not, so 20.66.99 is equivalent to 20.066.099. This demonstration continues to use the
same test environment present throughout this research, which includes the ControlLogix
L61 controller. The device is first updated with the legitimate FRN 20.013 firmware from
Rockwell in order to test the e↵ectiveness of a counterfeit update on the newest major
revision. ControlFlash is then used to update the device with the counterfeit FRN 20.066.
The update successfully completes, the device restarts, and the new 20.66.99 revision
number is reported to ControlFlash indicating a successful update as shown in Figure 4.16.
While ControlFlash is used in this case, a custom utility could also be developed to
perform the same operation. When attempting more complex firmware modifications,
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Figure 4.16: Successful firmware update to FRN 16.081 with spoofed 20.66.99 version
number.

ControlFlash poses certain complications. In oder to process the catalog of available
updates, ControlFlash references a restriction file (.RES extension) in addition to the
configuration script and firmware image.

This .RES file is used to determine if its

associated firmware has any usage restrictions. In addition, the .RES file contains yet
another type of checksum value for the firmware image. This particular algorithm is
exceptionally prone to collisions, so minor modifications are not detected, but extensive
modifications including changes in image length require the value to be recalculated. Since
.RES file processing is handled exclusively by ControlFlash, a custom update utility avoids
this validation. Given the minor modifications demonstrated in the case above, however,
the .RES file value does not require recalculation.
4.4

Discussion
In order to develop an understanding of the requirements for successful firmware

modification, this section discusses the prerequisites, advantages, and limitations of the
various techniques utilized throughout the reversing process. The discussion includes
issues related to time, cost, and complexity requirements of the various techniques as
well as their applicability and any problems encountered while applying the process to
the ControlLogix L61.
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For the ControlLogxix L61, firmware update packages are readily available from
the vendor through Rockwell Automation’s website. Furthermore, it is straightforward
to access the firmware image inside these update packages. The combination of these
circumstances provide a significant advantage in obtaining a wide range of firmware
samples with little time, cost, or e↵ort. However, the prerequisite to the advantages of
technique is a target device with upgradable firmware where the manufacturer makes such
updates openly available. Without such availability, the acquisition process is complicated
significantly.
The general format of a given firmware image is technically observable by viewing
the image in a binary file editor. However, manual detection of these structural features
is dependent on the particular firmware being analyzed and the personal experience of
the investigator. For example, an encrypted or obfuscated firmware image would impose
significant time limitations on the investigation. Although, if successful this technique may
provide the advantageous identification of potential image header and general structure
information.
Binary comparison of firmware is accurately capable of identifying dynamic and static
fields in the image. The advantage of binary comparison is the critical identification of
a candidate checksum value field as well as addition information regarding the image
header. This comes at no significant time, cost, or complexity requirements. However,
the technique is limited by the availability of multiple firmware sample images, where
its e↵ectiveness and accuracy is directly proportional to the number of samples available.
During investigation of the ControlLogix L61 firmware, initial comparison of the ends of
firmware images corrected for length by aligning the last bytes of the two compared images.
However, additional analysis conducted after the reversing process and demonstration
reveals that this approach is not the necessarily the most e↵ective due to potential variations
in the image trailer length. Data initially identified as unrelated at the ends of FRN20.013
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and FRN 13.071 is actually nearly identical when o↵set by 8 bytes. This di↵erence is a
result of the fact that FRN 13.071 lacks a CRC checksum value. Additional comparison
with FRN 15.060 reveals that the CRC checksum validation is present, so this functionality
is apparently added after FRN 13.071. Note that no FRN 14 samples are available from
Rockwell.
The signature-based analysis for embedded files and filesystems is limited by the
availability of a raw image that is not encrypted, compressed, or obfuscated. Additionally,
the Binwalk tool used in this case results in a number of false positives that require
additional time to examine. Still, it is a relatively straightforward process to eliminate
them as candidates, which is also aided by automation. Observations from this technique
indicate the accuracy of Binwalk varies depending on the target signature type. While the
gzip results are highly accurate, the zlib results are as equally inaccurate. The information
gained from this step indicates that the firmware contains mostly raw binary code and data,
which is significant. Had more significant files been embedded in the firmware, such as
a compressed symbol table as described by Peck and Peterson [44], the advantage of this
technique would significantly increase.
The significant advantage of processor identification is that it enables automated
disassembly using a tool such as IDA. In this case, the technique of instruction signature
comparison correctly identifies the processor architecture with no significant time or
complexity requirements. However, one limitation is the direct cost incurred by using
the IDA tool since it is a licensed software product. The alternative method of physical
analysis may also be limited by cost requirements since a physical device must be available
and physically disassembled.
The technique of searching for prologue signature provides the critical advantage
of identifying the locations of functions that follow the conventional prologue. These
functions are then available for further analysis. However, not all functions are guaranteed
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to do so. In the former case, as with the majority of functions in the test environment,
function identification is accomplished with no significant time, cost, or complexity
requirements beyond the cost of IDA. Considering the majority of functions follow the
standard prologue convention, this technique is highly e↵ective in providing a more
complete representation of the firmware.
The “load immediate” technique is technically capable of determining the correct base
address, but primarily amounts to an educated version of a brute force attack. It does not
incur any direct cost, but requires a significant amount of time to accomplish. The process
of identifying and testing immediate address values is straightforward, but the complexity
of implementation is introduced by the need to repeatedly test various possible solutions.
The success of this step requires disassembled firmware and the existence of multiple
immediate address references inside the scope of the firmware image. The advantage
of success is a proper base address that facilitates reverse engineering of functions by
providing accurate address references. While incremental progress is made using the
“load immediate” technique with the ControlLogix L61, the “starting location” value in
the firmware’s associated .nvs configuration file apparently indicates a base address value.
The use of the starting location value 0x0B160000 as the base address corroborates other
references to memory in the 0x0B000000 range, but the true base address in RAM is
later confirmed as 0x00D00000 (see Section 4.1.4.3). An analysis of all relevant address
references in the firmware must be performed regardless of any implied base address.
The technique of string examination may potentially determine a significant amount
of information regarding details of the firmware implementation. Also of significance
with the ControlLogix L61 is the lack of any copyright strings explicitly identifying the
OS used by the firmware. This eliminates several OS implementations as candidates,
including VxWorks, since they are known to contain copyright strings. As the number
of strings present in the image increase, however, so does the required amount of time
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to examine them. Execution of this technique is not significantly difficult, where the
majority of the required e↵ort is spent on researching the significance of discovered strings.
The sample firmware image used for this technique need not necessarily be disassembled
for the inspection, but must inherently contain strings of informational value. Despite
these limitations, the resulting information enables a more detailed understanding of the
firmware, including the identification of function names, although some of the information
is not necessarily relevant to deriving the validation method.
The ability to rebuild symbol names in the firmware is heavily dependent on the
availability of function or source file names in the firmware from the string inspection.
For the ControlLogix L61 firmware, the latter is available, providing successfully renamed
functions. However, a lack of such information severely limits the success of the overall
process. Further limitations of this technique include the ability to determine how the
available name strings relate to functions in the disassembly as well as writing a script
to automate the rebuilding. Despite these limitations, the successful application of this
technique provides the significant advantage of named functions. The availability of
function names enables the investigator to focus reverse engineering e↵orts on specifically
targeted functions.
From a technical perspective, the technique of disassembly analysis is capable of
successfully determining the location and operation of any validation method present in
the firmware. In practice, however, time constraints limit the amount of progress that
can possibly be made. Additionally, while there are no direct cost requirements, the
process of determining candidate functions and reversing their functionality is significantly
complex and dependent on knowledge and experience. The ability of this technique to find
relevant functions in the disassembly is reliant on the e↵ectiveness of the function naming
process. An analysis of all symbol or source filename strings is critical to understanding
the disassembled code. Furthermore, a complete list of names does not guarantee that
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the investigator can identify relevant names. Multiple searches of the function name list are
suggested to minimize this possibility. For example, initial review of the ControlLogix L61
source filenames failed to identify the name of a function related to the firmware update
validation method. One apparently obscure name is later determined to represent a function
that writes firmware updates to flash memory and performs the modular summation
checksum validation in the OS. This discovery confirms that disassembly analysis of the
OS firmware alone would derive the validation method given enough time and experience.
If successful, the derived validation method enables analysis and testing on the security
of its design. In this particular investigation, time and complexity constraints prevent
this technique from determining the validation method. However, it remains e↵ective as
a general technique to reverse specifically targeted areas of firmware code as demonstrated
in Section 4.1.4.3.
The presented technique of boundary checking is technically capable of determining
the range of data included in the validation method. Time and complexity requirements
incurred by critical bytes limit the ability to comprehensively check every firmware byte. In
addition, unknown variables, such as the fact that the ControlLogix L61 algorithms operate
over memory beyond the image, complicate matters. This case specifically makes boundary
checking, already complicated by concerns of damaging the device, ine↵ective without
such knowledge. The technique to check for common classes of firmware update validation
method algorithms can potentially determine if any of the specifically tested algorithms
are in use, but is complicated by variations on the basic cases tested. The detection of
modular summation class algorithms should have tested inverse relationships using the
di↵erence of 1 technique. For example, the inclusion of cases to check for changes by
-1 would correctly detect that a summation algorithm is in use for the ControlLogix L61
validation; however, this would still result in bricking the device given the additional
CRC validation. Regardless, determining whether the true firmware update validation
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method is a class of the tested cases or not provides advantageous insight either way.
Without the limitations of cost and time, a brute force technique is technically capable of
determining the validation method given a known class. However, with no guarantee that
the firmware update validation method implements a CRC, the additional complexity of
having an unknown class of firmware update validation method creates a countably infinite
number of possibilities, making a brute force attack futile. Furthermore, the brute force
test demonstrates that the time requirement alone precludes this approach from being truly
e↵ective. Overall, the black box approach is e↵ective at boundary checking and testing
common validation methods, but beyond these common configurations, black box testing
can not e↵ectively derive the true validation method.
The significant advantage provided by hardware debugging tools reinforces the
requirement of obtaining a test device. In addition to hardware debugging, a physical
reference device is required for testing modifications and allows for physical examination
of the device circuit board. Immediate cost requirements include the expenses of the
physical device under examination as well as any tools needed to aid in identification
of the ports. Time and complexity requirements for the ControlLogix L61 are minimal,
but devices may implement JTAG di↵erently, if at all, introducing a wide variance.
Locating JTAG test ports is only possible if the device hardware is designed with such
support. With the ControlLogix L61, JTAG TAPs are successfully identified, enabling
further hardware debugging. For configuration and memory acquisition, cost requirements
include the hardware and software required for debugging with JTAG, which is significant.
Time and complexity requirements for acquiring and analyzing memory images are also
significant. Although the memory acquisition is straightforward, the analysis and reverse
engineering of the acquired image is more time consuming and complex. Once connected
to the device, the image acquisition and analysis technique takes advantage of hardware
debugging capabilities and applies previously discussed reversing techniques on the newly
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acquired memory. An additional concern of hardware debugging determined with the
ControlLogix L61 is the existence of watchdog timers that may be e↵ected by halting
the OS. Watchdog timers may e↵ectively limit the abilities of a debugger. Overall, the use
of hardware debugging tools facilitates the derivation of both checksum algorithms for the
ControlLogix L61 and also provides access to otherwise inaccessible information such as
the initialization and executive loading processes. While the use of hardware debugging
is not strictly required to derive the ControlLogix L61 firmware update validation method,
it remains an e↵ective technique for doing so. In addition, the availability of hardware
debugging tools is critical in recovering a bricked test device.
4.5

Summary
This section demonstrates the feasibility of a counterfeit firmware attack on a common

PLC. This is accomplished by following a general process based on various reverse
engineering techniques to derive the firmware update validation method. After confirming
the correctness of the derived method, its design is analyzed for design weaknesses
enabling the intentional modification and counterfeiting of the firmware. The applied
reversing process is e↵ective in deriving the validation method in this case. While the
technique of disassembly analysis is limited by the complexity of the firmware binary,
and the e↵ectiveness of black box analysis is limited to detecting common validation
methods, hardware debugging provides a significant advantage in the reversing process.
The successful demonstration provides a realistic example of a counterfeit firmware update
by exploiting a weakness in the design of the firmware update validation method.
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V.
5.1

Conclusions and Future Work

Conclusions
Industrial control systems are responsible for the management and automation of

an ever increasing number of processes in national critical infrastructure. Embedded
computing devices called PLCs o↵er immediate access to physical process elements in
these applications and are critical in ensuring their proper operation. In the escalation
of attacks on these devices, tools and techniques exhibit growing sophistication with an
emphasis on subverting the system at incrementally lower levels. Hardware components
of the devices representing the lowest level remain uniquely inaccessible to attackers
without physical compromise at either the production or operational stages. Meanwhile,
e↵orts focused on user programming at the highest level fail to adequately avert isolated
detection, relying primarily on assistance from an insider threat or additional supervisory
malware. The intermediate firmware level provides a compromise between accessibility,
functionality, and autonomy while simultaneously exploiting the current deficiencies in
detection methods.
This thesis determines the feasibility of firmware modification attacks on PLCs
through the investigation and assessment of a common PLC to counterfeit firmware
updates. A review of related works in the field of embedded devices reverse engineering
provides various techniques that are integrated into a general reversing process to derive
the firmware update validation method of PLCs. This process consists of four steps:
(i) firmware acquisition, (ii) binary analysis of firmware, (iii) firmware disassembly, and
(iv) derivation of the firmware update validation method. Step (iv) is presented as three
approaches: (a) disassembly analysis, (b) black box analysis, and (c) hardware debugging
analysis.

80

The reversing process is applied to a test environment, consisting of an AllenBradley ControlLogix L61.

In this environment, the process is able to successfully

derive the firmware update validation method. Firmware acquisition, binary analysis, and
disassembly reveal general firmware information and prepare the firmware for step (iv).
Disassembly analysis is a technique capable of deriving the firmware update validation
method, but limited in e↵ectiveness by the availability of descriptive disassembly, time
available, and experience of the attacker. Black box analysis is potentially e↵ective in
reducing the search space of candidate algorithm classes, but a full brute force attack is
not feasible. This technique is limited by time and the complexity of the firmware update
validation method in use. Hardware debugging analysis provides the advantages of direct
access to the device and augmenting disassembly analysis for successful derivation of the
firmware update validation method of the test device. This approach is limited by the
availability of hardware debugging support on the device and costs incurred by the special
equipment required.
After deriving the firmware update validation method, the candidate algorithm is tested
for correctness against available sample firmware images. The algorithm is then analyzed
for design weaknesses that allow for intentionally modified firmware to pass validation.
Such a weakness identified in the ControlLogix firmware is exploited and demonstrated
with an example of counterfeit firmware. After spoofing the version number, an old
firmware version is uploaded to the test system and successfully validated, reporting a
new version number. This research confirms that firmware update validation methods in
common use su↵er from design weaknesses that facilitate firmware modification attack.
Thus, this thesis verifies the feasibility of attacks targeting PLCs through the use of
counterfeit firmware updates.
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5.2

Significance
Unlike programming flaws such as a bu↵er overflow vulnerability that might allow

for arbitrary code injection, the firmware update process is not manipulated or abused to
achieve the same result. While a bu↵er overflow attack exploits a patchable vulnerability,
firmware validation is a design level feature. The underlying software on the device
intentionally inaccessible by the user, the executive loader, uses a modular summation
algorithm to validate the firmware image. This design is intended to prevent the execution
of corrupt firmware in the event of accidental modification. However, given the ability
to upload firmware to the device, there exists no protection against intentional firmware
modification.
This research demonstrates an example of a minor modification with a significant
impact if used with malicious intent. By spoofing the version number, an older firmware
version can be counterfeited to appear as a new version. Given known vulnerabilities in
previous firmware versions, an attacker may exploit an old vulnerability in the firmware.
As far as the operator and the control software for the device are aware, the version number
reported by the PLC indicates that the new and secure firmware is correctly installed.
This research successfully verifies the feasibility of counterfeit firmware attacks on a
common PLC. Considerations of the reversing process also provide necessary insight into
the requirements and limitations of successfully counterfeiting firmware. This knowledge
enables the development of defensive and forensic analysis techniques for firmware
modification attacks. As a direct result of this research, realistic counterfeit firmware can be
developed to assist researchers in detection and analysis techniques. Overall, this research
demonstrates that, although the process and requirements to counterfeit firmware are not
trivial and there exist limitations dependent on the device and the examiner, the threat posed
to ICS security is credible and requires further attention.
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5.3

Future Work
5.3.1

Direct Extensions.

As an extension to this work, the reversing process described may be considered
as a basis for the vulnerability analysis of other PLC validation methods. Although
the ControlLogix L61 used in the test environment is common, there remain numerous
alternative controllers present in ICS applications.

In order to develop an accurate

awareness of general ICS vulnerabilities to this specific threat, further assessments should
be applied to as many common PLCs as possible. It may also be possible to automate
portions of the process to aid in this assessment. Indeed, the process described here
may aide in the development of an automated assessment tool. In addition, the scope
of the assessment should also be expanded to include external factors not considered
in this work, such as the vulnerability of PLCs to remote counterfeit firmware updates.
Such a vulnerability, if feasibly exploitable, presents an expanded attack surface for
firmware attacks. Beyond the process itself, additional applications include the creation
of counterfeit firmware samples. Through the process and information provided by this
research, various samples of counterfeit firmware may be created to facilitate analysis and
testing of realistic samples for the purposes of detection and forensic capabilities.
5.3.2

Preventative Measures.

E↵ective mitigation strategies for the threat of firmware attacks are reliant upon device
manufacturers to follow secure design practices. The most apparent requirement for a
secure firmware update method is a secure validation algorithm. A validation method able
to detect intentional changes is a significant step towards more secure controllers. One such
process is conceptualized in the form of digital signatures. By digitally signing legitimate
firmware images, the vendor provides a means to validate that the firmware is authentic and
unaltered. Digital signatures use asymmetric cryptography to create a digest, or signature,
of the message (i.e., the firmware) using a private key held securely by the manufacturer
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[34]. In this scheme, a controller presented with a firmware update uses the corresponding
public key to validate that the signature is generated by the manufacturer’s private key.
In order for any type of secure validation method to be e↵ective, another requirement
is that the manufacturer implement the method external to the OS firmware. The current
implementation of the CRC algorithm in the ControlLogix emphasizes this point. Since
the CRC algorithm is solely contained in the OS firmware, it is ine↵ective from a security
perspective. Passing the modular summation validation present in the executive loader is
sufficient to load and execute the firmware. Direct alteration of the firmware binary enables
the removal of any validation functionality present in the OS.
In addition to implementing a secure validation method, alternative options should be
considered for controlling access to the firmware. This may be implemented, for example,
by requiring a valid serial number to access firmware update packages on vendor websites.
This limits firmware access to those who possess a controller or have access to a valid serial
number. Another approach is to obfuscate or encrypt firmware images. Although obscurity
alone is not a sound solution to design security and such tactics create overhead in the
executive loader, they may still inhibit attackers’ ability to reverse engineer the firmware or
implement meaningful modifications.
While the strategies proposed thus far have the potential to defend against firmware
counterfeiting from a software perspective, hardware debugging tools provide low level
access to the device enabling the manipulation of this software. Using a standard interface
like JTAG, an attacker may obtain access to the executive loader and observe the details of
any validation or obfuscation algorithms. Permanently disabling or locking out hardware
debugging support for the controller after production should be considered.
Due to complexities arising from a redesign of the validation method, in addition to
possible resistance by industry customers, adoption rates of direct design solutions may be
low. For this reason, alternative solutions should also be explored in an e↵ort to provide

84

mitigation with comprehensive protection. Possible solutions include external validation
tools capable of detecting counterfeit firmware. Such solutions may be implemented
as either standalone or network level protection in a control system.

As part of a

comprehensive security plan, such detection and defense mechanisms may be integrated
into an existing intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system (IPS). By
monitoring network activity, such defensive measures may detect and possibly prevent
unauthorized firmware updates to devices. Further research in these areas may provide
solutions with adequate protection that are deployable in current environments.
5.3.3

Detection and Forensic Analysis.

The research and development of preemptive detection, firmware acquisition, and
forensic analysis techniques for cases of counterfeit firmware is crucial to provide adequate
protection for exposed critical infrastructure control systems. Detection methods are
required to identify modified firmware in operational systems where cost and production
considerations take priority over secure configurations, possibly leaving devices vulnerable
to attack. Firmware acquisition techniques allow for both detection and analysis based on
a complete or partial firmware image obtained directly from the device. Forensic analysis
techniques applied to the acquired image facilitate assessment of its operational status and
possible indicators of attack.
5.3.3.1

Indirect Methods.

Indirect methods like black-box testing and side-channel analysis may be used to infer
the internal characteristics of a PLC for the purposes of detection and forensic analysis.
Black-box testing involves systematic manipulation of device inputs while measuring
outputs to infer information regarding the logic operating on the device.

This may

potentially enable the detection of malicious logic on the device with little to no knowledge
of the underlying software. Black-box techniques can also be applied to a known clean
device in order to create a fingerprint for future comparisons. Common metrics applied to
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black-box testing include the system’s conformance to specifications, error recovery ability,
defined security responses, performance, and configurability [31].
The goal of side-channel analysis is to infer information about the system based
on measurements of external factors referred to as the side channels. By measuring a
side channel, it may be possible to infer operational conditions inside the system. Some
possible side channels worth considering include power [30], timing [29], temperature,
and electromagnetic emanations [3]. Black-box and side-channel analysis may potentially
facilitate detection of firmware deviations while minimizing direct impacts to the device.
5.3.3.2

Direct Methods.

Direct detection and analysis techniques fall into two categories: software-based and
hardware-based. Software backdoors in a system may provide an attacker control over the
system by taking advantage of access mechanisms intended to provide low-level access to
system developers. Such features left over from development or improperly secured may
allow read access to firmware memory. Recent research presenting hard coded passwords
left in the device firmware by developers are an example [9, 51, 60]. In addition to built
in functionality, the exploitation of a vulnerability on the device may also allow access
to the firmware in memory. As demonstrated on the iPhone [22], an exploit that gains
execution control of the device may allow the injection of instructions to output the contents
of memory containing firmware. Software-based methods are potentially advantageous
since a firmware image may be obtained remotely without physical access to the device.
It may even be possible to obtain the image from a live system to minimize or avoid any
operational interruptions. Potential disadvantages of these methods include their inherent
interaction with the device, which may adversely a↵ect forensic fidelity or completeness.
Hardware-based methods rely largely on the techniques presented in this research. A
hardware debugging interface to the target device through a standard such as JTAG allows
for direct memory reads to dump the firmware. Since JTAG is an optional standard, not
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every device necessarily supports it. In the worst case, there may be no hardware debugging
standard implemented at all. However, the processes described here may be used to obtain
a firmware image if hardware debugging is supported. Barring the success of an image
capture using JTAG, an alternative is to perform independent chip analysis. This method
involves physically removing the flash chip containing the firmware from the circuit board
in order to read it directly [11]. These hardware-based methods o↵er the potential benefit
of providing a complete image of the memory while maintaining a high level of forensic
integrity. One potential drawback, however, is their dependency on physical access to the
system. In the case of independent chip analysis, the system must be dismantled, possibly
resulting in permanent destruction.
5.4

Summary
This research demonstrates that counterfeit firmware attacks on a common PLC

are feasible. This vulnerability is a result of insecure design of the firmware update
validation method.

The described process provides insight into the advantages and

limitations of particular attack techniques, and the counterfeit firmware provides a realistic
example for use in future research. Other common PLCs should also be assessed for
similar vulnerabilities to firmware modification. Preventative measures such as securely
designed validation methods or external validation mechanisms must be considered and
implemented. Finally, future work must also include the development of detection and
forensic analysis capabilities, possibly based on black box and side channel analysis or the
direct analysis of firmware on the device.
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Appendix A: ControlLogix Firmware Operation Flowcharts

Figure A.1: Overview of ControlLogix L61 operation.
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Figure A.2: Flow chart of ExecLoader.s.

89

Appendix B: Contents of Firmware Update Package
B.1

PN-86270.nvs

[Device]
NewRevision = 19.11.16
DialogNewRevision = 19.11.16
NumberUpdates = 1
ConnectionType = UNCONNECTED
NumberIdentities = 87
Vendor
Id
Identity1
Identity2
Identity3
Identity4
Identity5
Identity6

=
=
=
=
=
=

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

Product
Type
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,

Product
Code

Major
Revision

0x36,
0x37,
0x38,
0x38,
0x38,
0x36,

Minor
Revision

Catalog
Revisions

HW Major
Revision

HW Minor
Revision

1,
1,
1,
10,
11,
12,

0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,

1756-L61,
1756-L62,
1756-L63,
1756-L63,
1756-L63,
1756-L61,

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

0
0
0
0
0
0

19,
19,
19,
19,
19,
19,
19,
19,
19,

0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,
0,

1756-L61,
1756-L62,
1756-L63,
1756-L61,
1756-L62,
1756-L63,
1756-L61,
1756-L62,
1756-L63,

1,
1,
1,
2,
2,
2,
3,
3,
3,

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

...[lines removed for brevity]...
Identity79
Identity80
Identity81
Identity82
Identity83
Identity84
Identity85
Identity86
Identity87

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,

0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,
0x0e,

0x36,
0x37,
0x38,
0x36,
0x37,
0x38,
0x36,
0x37,
0x38,

[Update1]
NVSInstance = 3
MajorRevision = 19
MinorRevision = 11
MaxTimeoutSeconds = 60
StartingLocation = 0xb160000
FileSize = 2546132
DataFileName = PN-86272.bin
UpdateReset = 1
AutoResetOnError = 0
FirstTransferDelay = 0
ErrorInstructions = Manually Reset module
[About Info]
/******************** COPYRIGHT AND LICENCE NOTICE ********************
"Contains BIGDIGITS multiple-precision arithmetic code originally
written by David Ireland, copyright (c) 2001-5 by D.I. Management
Services Pty Limited <www.di-mgt.com.au>, and is used with
permission."
*************** END OF COPYRIGHT AND LICENCE NOTICE ******************/
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B.2

CONTENTS.TXT

ControlFlash Firmware Upgrade Kit Contents
Created: 09/27/10 08:24:01
Catalog Number
1756-L61
1756-L62
1756-L63

B.3

Revision
19.11.16
19.11.16
19.11.16

Script Filename
C:\FIRMWARE\1756-L6X\V19\19.11\PN-86270.nvs
C:\FIRMWARE\1756-L6X\V19\19.11\PN-86270.nvs
C:\FIRMWARE\1756-L6X\V19\19.11\PN-86270.nvs

PN-86270.RES

Figure B.1: Contents of PN-86270.RES in HxD.

B.4

PN-86272.bin

Figure B.2: Beginning of FRN19.011 binary in HxD.
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Appendix C: VBinDi↵ Examples

Figure C.1: VBinDi↵ of FRN16.081 and FRN16.057 beginning.

Figure C.2: VBinDi↵ of FRN16.081 and FRN16.057 end.
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Figure C.3: VBinDi↵ of FRN20.013 and FRN13.071 beginning.

Figure C.4: Length-corrected VBinDi↵ of FRN20.013 and FRN13.071 end.
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Appendix D: Physical Component Analysis

Figure D.1: Circuit board of the 1756-L61/B.
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D.1

Components of Interest
A. Central Processing Unit
Manufacturer: Philips
Part Number: VY22575
Description: This is the main processor of the ControlLogix L61.

No official

documentation is available for this chip. It is presumably a custom design based on the
ARM7TDMI, as determined by ARM’s RealView Debugger configuration tool. Further
research suggests the chip may be similar to the ARM740T, a specific configuration of
the ARM7TDMI. This is due to the fact that the ARM740T includes a memory protection
unit (MPU) and initialization code for the ControlLogix L61 references MPU initialization
functions. A comparison of this MPU initialization code with official documentation for
the ARM740T reveals similar, but not identical, operation of the MPU [5]. Little else is
known about this chip.
B. Backplane Communications Processor
Manufacturer: Atmel
Part Number: AT56J05-UQ3T
Description: This is the processor used to handle backplane communication on the
device. No official documentation is available for this chip. It is presumably another
custom chip. The same chip is present on most ControlLogix modules near the backplane
connector. Little is known about its design or functionality.
C. Non-volatile Storage (Flash Memory)
Manufacturer: Intel
Part Number: 640J3F75
Description: This is the flash memory chip used for non-volatile storage on the
device. No official documentation is available for this specific chip. However, a search
of the part number results in several references to flash chips manufactured by Micron

95

Technology with similar part numbers. Intel rolled their flash memory operations into
a joint venture company called Numonyx in 2008. Two years later, Micron Technology
acquired Numonyx [56]. The data sheet found for a Numonyx flash chip by Micron seems
to reference a very similar, if not identical chip [36]. A comparison of flash memory
operations performed by the ControlLogix L61 firmware correctly correspond to operations
found in this datasheet.
D.

Standard 14-pin ARM JTAG Connector Pads

Figure D.2: 14-pin ARM JTAG pin configuration as viewed in Figure D.1

E. User Memory
Manufacturer: Cypress
Part Number: CY7C1041CV33
Description: Static RAM (SRAM), 4Mb; This is the user memory available to
the operator for storing projects.

Capacity: 4Mb per module, 2MB total.

documentation is found in Reference [16].
F.

Volatile RAM

Manufacturer: Micron Technologies
Part Number: 48LC4M16A2
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Official

Description: Synchronous Dynamic RAM (SDRAM), 64Mb; This is the volatile
RAM used by the device during runtime. Capacity: 64Mb per module, 24MB total. Official
documentation is found in Reference [35].
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Appendix E: Source Code
E.1
1
2

zlib analysis.sh

# ! / bin / bash
#zlib script

3
4
5
6
7
8

i f [ ! n ” $1 ” ]
then
e c h o ” u s a g e : ‘ basename $0 ‘ < f i l e n a m e >”
exit
fi

9
10
11
12

m k d i r tmp
cd tmp
binwalk y z l i b

. . / $1

dd= z l i b : z l i b >/ dev / n u l l

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

for f i l e in *. zlib
do
i f . . / z p i p e d < $ f i l e > $ f i l e . b i n 2 >/ dev / n u l l
then
e c h o ” $ f i l e seems l e g i t ”
cp $ f i l e . b i n . . /
#else
#rm $ f i l e . b i n
# e c h o ” $ f i l e was d e l e t e d ”
fi
done

25
26
27

cd . .
#rm r f tmp
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Appendix F: IDA Scripts
F.1
1
2
3
4

FindARMFunctions.idc
FindARMFunctions . i d c
Based on MakeFuncs . i d c by Ruben S a n t a m a r t a , www. r e v e r s e m o d e . com * /
E d i t e d by Z a c h r y B a s n i g h t
AFIT * /
F i n d and make f u n c t i o n s i n C o n t r o l L o g i x 1756 L61 f i r m w a r e * /

//
/*
/*
/*

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

# i n c l u d e <idc . idc >
s t a t i c main ( ) {
a ut o ea ;
a u t o eaFunc ;
a u t o minea ;
auto prolog ;
auto i ;
auto gProArray ;

14

minea = MinEA ( ) ;
S e t S t a t u s ( IDA STATUS WORK ) ;
Message ( ” F i x i n g f i r m w a r e . . . \ n ” ) ;

15
16
17
18

/ / c r e a t e a r r a y o f op c o d e s i g n a t u r e s f o r f u n c t i o n s
g P r o A r r a y = C r e a t e A r r a y ( ” ProGos ” ) ;
i f ( g P r o A r r a y == 1)
g P r o A r r a y = G e t A r r a y I d ( ” ProGos ” ) ;
S e t A r r a y S t r i n g ( g P r o A r r a y , 0 , ” 2D E9 ” ) ; / / ”2D E9 ” i s t h e o n l y one u s e d h e r e

19
20
21
22
23
24

f o r ( i = 0 ; i <1; i ++ ) { / / f o r e a c h op c o d e i n t h e a r r a y
e a = minea ;
p r o l o g = G e t A r r a y E l e m e n t ( AR STR , g P r o A r r a y , i ) ;
Message ( ” Opcodes : [ %s ] . . . \ n ” , p r o l o g ) ;

25
26
27
28
29

w h i l e ( 1 ) { / / s e a r c h b i n a r y f o r op c o d e
e a F u n c = F i n d B i n a r y ( ea , SEARCH DOWN, p r o l o g ) ; / / f i n d n e x t i n s t a n c e
i f ( e a F u n c == BADADDR )
break ;
/ / b r e a k i f t h e r e a r e no more
eaFunc = eaFunc
2;
/ / b a c k up t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e l i t t l e
MakeCode ( e a F u n c ) ;
/ / d i s a s s e m b l e t h e code h e r e
M a k e F u n c t i o n ( eaFunc , BADADDR ) ; / / make t h e c o d e i n t o a f u n c t i o n
ea = eaFunc + 4 ;
/ / move t o t h e n e x t word
}
Message ( ”OK\ n ” ) ;

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

}

}
Message ( ” Done \ n ” ) ; S e t S t a t u s ( IDA STATUS READY ) ;

F.2
1
2
3
4

//
//
//
//

NameL61Functions.idc

NameL61Functions . i d c
W r i t t e n by Z a c h r y B a s n i g h t
AFIT
L o o s e l y b a s e d on c o d e by Ruben S a n t a m a r t a , www. r e v e r s e m o d e . com
Name f u n c t i o n s i n C o n t r o l L o g i x 1756 L61 f i r m w a r e b a s e d on s o u r c e f i l e

5
6
7
8
9
10

e n d i a n word

# i n c l u d e <idc . idc >
s t a t i c main ( ) {
a ut o ea ;
a u t o eaFunc ;
auto s t r ;
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strings

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto
auto

i;
name ;
len ;
end ;
start ;
ch ;
refAddr ;
funcName ;
suffix ;
NamesArray ;
arrayLen ;
idx ;

23
24
25

e a = MinEA ( ) ;
S e t S t a t u s ( IDA STATUS WORK ) ;

26
27
28
29

s t r = ” 2E 2E 5C” ; / / ” . . \ ” magic s t r i n g i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s t a r t o f s o u r c e f i l e n a m e s
NamesArray = C r e a t e A r r a y ( ” Names ” ) ;
arrayLen = 0;

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

while (1) { / / search e n t i r e binary
e a = F i n d B i n a r y ( ea , SEARCH DOWN, s t r ) ; / / s e a r c h f o r magic s t r i n g
i f ( e a == BADADDR )
b r e a k ; / / b r e a k i f e r r o r o r p a s t t h e end
name = Name ( e a ) ; / / g e t t h e IDA d a t a b a s e name o f t h e c u r r e n t l o c a t i o n
len = 1;

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

i f ( name != ” ” ) { / / i f t h e l o c a t i o n i s n o t a l r e a d y named . . .
Message ( ”%s \ n ” , name ) ;
/ / g e t b i n a r y a s a s t r i n g and d e t e r m i n e i t s l e n g t h
name = G e t S t r i n g ( ea ,
1 , ASCSTR C ) ;
l e n = s t r l e n ( name ) ;
end = l e n ;

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

do { / / w o r k i n g b a c k w a r d s , remove t h e f i l e e x t e n s i o n from ” name ”
end = end 1;
ch = s u b s t r ( name , end , end +1) ;
} w h i l e ( ch != ” . ” ) ;
s t a r t = end ;
do { / / s t i l l w o r k i n g b a c k w a r d s , f i n d t h e s t a r t o f t h e f i l e n a m e ( n o t t h e p a t h )
s t a r t = s t a r t 1;
ch = s u b s t r ( name , s t a r t , s t a r t +1) ;
} w h i l e ( ch != ” \ \ ” ) ;
s t a r t = s t a r t +1;
name = s u b s t r ( name , s t a r t , end ) ; / / ” name ” i s now j u s t t h e f i l e n a m e s a n s e x t e n s i o n
Message ( ”%s \ n ” , name ) ;
/ / s e a r c h f o r name i n a r r a y o f names a l r e a d y f o u n d / u s e d
idx = arrayLen ;
s u f f i x = 1;
f o r ( i =0; i < a r r a y L e n ; i ++) {
i f ( name == G e t A r r a y E l e m e n t ( AR STR , NamesArray , i * 2 ) ) {
s u f f i x = G e t A r r a y E l e m e n t (AR LONG , NamesArray , ( i * 2 ) +1) ;
idx = i *2;
break ;
}
}
/ / i f n o t f o u n d add i t
i f ( i d x == a r r a y L e n ) {
S e t A r r a y S t r i n g ( NamesArray , i d x , name ) ;
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S e t A r r a y L o n g ( NamesArray , i d x +1 , 0 ) ;
a r r a y L e n = a r r a y L e n +2;

74
75

}

76
77

refAddr = D f i r s t B ( ea ) ; / / g e t t h e f i r s t a d d r e s s t h a t r e f e r e n c e s t h e f i l e n a m e s t r i n g
/ / Message (”%x \ n ” , r e f A d d r ) ;

78
79
80

/ / f o r e v e r y c r o s s r e f e r e n c e a d d r e s s , name t h a t a d d r e s s a s t h e f i l e n a m e
w h i l e ( r e f A d d r != BADADDR) {
funcName = G e t F u n c t i o n N a m e ( r e f A d d r ) ;
i f ( funcName != ” ” ) { / / i f a d d r e s s i s a named f u n c t i o n . . .
i f ( s t r s t r ( funcName , ” s u b ” ) == 0 ) { / / t h a t s t a r t s w i t h ” s u b ” ( a u t o n a m e d ) . . .
suffix = suffix + 1;
e a F u n c = LocByName ( funcName ) ; / / rename f u n c and add t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s u f f i x
MakeNameEx ( eaFunc , s p r i n t f ( ”%s %d ” , name , s u f f i x ) , SN NOCHECK & SN NON AUTO &
SN NOWARN) ;
}
}
r e f A d d r = DnextB ( ea , r e f A d d r ) ;
/ / Message (”%x \ n ” , r e f A d d r ) ;
}
S e t A r r a y L o n g ( NamesArray , i d x +1 , s u f f i x ) ;

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

}
e a = e a+ l e n ; / / i n c r e m e n t p a s t t h e s t r i n g and k e e p g o i n g

95
96
97
98
99

}

}
Message ( ” Done \ n ” ) ; S e t S t a t u s ( IDA STATUS READY ) ;
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Appendix G: ARM DS-5 Debugger Scripts
G.1
1
2
3

EasyReset.ds

# EasyReset . ds
# W r i t t e n by Z a c h r y B a s n i g h t
AFIT
# T h i s s c r i p t r e s e t s t h e L61 when h a l t e d i n t h e DS 5 d e b u g g e r .

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

# The L61 s t a r t s e x e c u t i o n a t 0 x08000000 on powerup , b u t t h e
# DS 5 d e b u g g e r r e s e t s PC t o 0 , s o we n e e d t o l o a d t h e b o o t c o d e
r e s t o r e 0 x08000000 . b i n b i n a r y 0 x0
# Where ”0 x08000000 . b i n ” i s a b i n a r y f i l e c o n t a i n i n g t h e
# L61 b o o t c o d e l o c a t e d a t 0 x08000000 .
wait
h b r e a k p * 0 x00D00000
# s e t h a r d w a r e b r e a k p o i n t a t t h e s t a r t o f t h e OS f i r m w a r e
s e t v a r $pc = 0 x00000000 # r e s e t PC t o 0
wait
continue

15
16

# e x e c u t i o n w i l l b r e a k a t t h e s t a r t o f t h e f i r m w a r e , u s e ” c o n t i n u e ” t o r u n OS

G.2
1
2
3
4

#
#
#
#

FullReset.ds

F u l l R e s e t . ds
W r i t t e n by Z a c h r y B a s n i g h t
AFIT
T h i s s c r i p t l o a d s a d e s i r e d OS f i r m w a r e i n t o memory , r e s e t s t h e L61 a l l o w i n g E x e c L o a d e r
t o i n i t i a l i z e , t h e n jumps d i r e c t l y t o t h e l o a d e d f i r m w a r e . U s e f u l f o r d e b r i c k i n g .

5
6
7
8

# l o a d 0 x08000000 b o o t c o d e t o 0 , s e e E a s y R e s e t . d s
r e s t o r e 0 x08000000 . b i n b i n a r y 0 x0
wait

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

# l o a d d e s i r e d f i r m w a r e t o r u n t i m e memory l o c a t i o n
r e s t o r e ” . . \ mem dumps \PN 66834 w i t h p a d d i n g . b i n ” b i n a r y 0 xD00000
wait
h b r e a k d p * 0 x0A000098 # s e t h a r d w a r e b r e a k p o i n t a f t e r E x e c L o a d e r i n i t i a l i z e s
s e t v a r $pc = 0 x00000000 # r e s e t PC t o 0
wait
# wait for ” s e t var ” to f i n i s h
continue
# continue execution at 0
wait
# w a i t u n t i l e x e c u t i o n b r e a k s a t 0 x0A000098
s e t v a r $pc = 0 x00D00000 # s e t PC t o s t a r t o f l o a d e d f i r m w a r e
wait

20
21

# e x e c u t i o n w i l l b r e a k a t t h e s t a r t o f t h e f i r m w a r e , u s e ” c o n t i n u e ” t o r u n OS
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